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Democracy and Health: Situating Health Rights within a 
Republic of Reasons 
Alicia Ely Yamin & Tara Boghosian* 
Abstract: 
Patterns of population health are keen reflections of structural inequities in 
societies, yet they are rarely subject to the requirements of democratic justification 
that other systemic inequalities provoke. Nor are health systems generally subject 
to societal scrutiny regarding fidelity to normative commitments of dignity and 
equality. Increased recognition of social determinants of health has challenged the 
narrow biomedical view of health as a stochastic phenomenon. More recently the 
sweeping devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare structural 
injustices across many democracies, which contributed to widely disparate rates of 
infection and mortality. However, a lack of clarity remains regarding the 
conceptual linkages between the right to health and the institutional arrangements 
required for diverse people to live flourishing lives in a plural democracy. Here we 
attempt to contribute to a deeper understanding of the right to health by examining 
the implications of three related claims: (1) the content of a right to health (public 
health preconditions and care) reflects the arrangement of social institutions and 
the negotiation of difference in a plural democracy; (2) health systems are 
democratic institutions that should be organized around showing diverse persons 
equal moral consideration; and (3) democratic accountability can enhance health 
protections across borders. We argue that understanding the connections between 
health and democracy has profound implications for health system financing, 
priority-setting, and the organization and delivery of health goods and services, as 
well as oversight. Further, underscoring the connections between health and 
democracy inexorably calls upon us to enlarge our conception of the way legal 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global COVID-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-
CoV-2 has focused the world’s attention on the central importance of population 
health and health systems to the economic and social well-being of societies, and 
to the globalized interconnected world. It has also highlighted the challenges to the 
democratic rule of law through widely varying actions, and justifications for such 
actions, adopted by governments in response. For example, South Korea has 
adopted a detailed system of contract tracing that includes the publishing of 
personal information about infected persons’ movements and medical care.1 In 
countless countries, governments imposed near-total lockdowns, with police 
enforcement and criminal penalties for those who venture outside for non-
permissible reasons.2 And faced with evidence of rising gender-based violence due 
to such lockdowns, national and sub-national governments haven taken different 
measures, including, in Bogotá, Colombia, authorizing men and women to leave 
their homes to seek essentials on alternating days, with trans persons authorized to 
leave home on the days that accord with their gender identity.3 The essence of 
democracy—and human rights—is that a government’s authority depends upon it 
making decisions that diverse members of the public perceive as justified and 
accept as legitimate.4 The crisis has thus brought to the fore long-standing 
questions about when and how governments can impose limitations on well-
enshrined democratic rights and rule of law principles, in relation, for example, to 
declarations of states of exception and emergency, restrictions on freedoms of 
movement and association, and intrusions into privacy through surveillance of data 
or movements.5 
 
 1. Max. S. Kim, Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing, NEW YORKER (April 
17, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-in-digital-
contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/DP7V-KCNQ]. 
 2. Juliana Kaplan, Lauren Frias & Morgan McFall-Johnsen, A Third of the Global Population 
Is on Coronavirus Lockdown — Here’s Our Constantly Updated List of Countries and Restrictions, 
BUS. INSIDER (April 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.in/international /news/a-third-of-the-
global-population-is-on-coronavirus-lockdown-x2014-hereaposs-our-constantly-updated-list-of-
countries-and-restrictions/slidelist/75208623.cms [https://perma.cc /8NUG-HWH7]. 
 3. Julie Turkewitz, To Beat the Virus, Colombia Tries Separating Men and Women, N.Y. 
TIMES (April 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/world/americas/virus-colombia-
bogota-men-women.html [https://perma.cc/K46R-EHQ8]. Bogotá’s mayor, Claudia López, has 
expressly stated that transgender people can follow the gender with which they identify. Id. 
 4. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]. 
 5. See, e.g., Governments Should Respect Rights in COVID-19 Surveillance, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (April 2, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/governments-should-respect-rights-
covid-19-surveillance [https://perma.cc/QD4M-WSZK]; Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 
Response, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-
dimensions-covid-19-response [https://perma.cc/NM2S-YP2C]; Francesco Martone, Italy, 
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Insisting upon adequate justification for limitations and derogation from civil 
rights established under constitutional and international legal frameworks is 
critical to our understandings of democratic orders. However, we focus here on 
situating the right to health itself—in normal times as well as crisis—in relation to 
a robust conception of democracy. The right to health under international law is 
neither a right to be healthy nor a right to health care only. Under international law, 
the right to health includes public health preconditions (water and sanitation) and 
health care that is available, accessible, acceptable, and of “adequate” quality.6 Our 
argument is three-fold: (1) equitable public health measures and health care are 
essential to constructing and sustaining substantive democracy in the twenty-first 
century; (2) the health system itself is a social institution that both reflects and 
refracts social norms—akin to a justice system—and therefore should be organized 
and function so as to ensure equal concern and respect for everyone in a 
democracy; and (3) in a highly interconnected world, the accountability of 
democratic governments must encompass people and impacts that cross borders. 
On one level, the notion that population health and democracy are intimately 
connected seems self-evident. For instance, in the United States, the lead 
contamination of the water supply in the overwhelmingly Black community of 
Flint, Michigan, vividly reflects the exclusionary nature of American society on 
the basis of race and class.7 Indeed, at least since Rudolf Virchow’s work in the 
nineteenth century underscored the social origins of disease and the need to address 
epidemics through not merely medical but political means, there has been an 
awareness of health states and health systems as part of the fabric of a democratic 
polity.8 The great movements for universal health care in the twentieth century, 
including the creation of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom,9 were 
democratic struggles for inclusion in society—of organized labor, indigenous and 
 
Democracy and COVID-19, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (April 14, 2020), 
https://www.tni.org/en/article/italy-democracy-and-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/75PB-625F] 
(describing how COVID-19 is impacting democratic governance in Italy, from constraining political 
debate on pandemic-related decisions to the lack of oversight by an independent human rights 
institution). 
 6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 
of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 12(a)–(d), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 
(2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. 
 7. Abby Goodnough, Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, When the Water Turned Brown, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/us/when-the-water-turned-brown.html 
[https://perma.cc/44U3-9FUN]. 
 8. RUDOLF VIRCHOW, DISEASE, LIFE, AND MAN (1958). 
 9. Christopher Newdick, Can Judges Ration with Compassion? A Priority Setting Matrix, 20 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 107, 111 (2018). 
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landless persons, and the destitute.10 The narrative of health constructed by the 
steady rise of medicalization, beginning in the nineteenth century and accelerating 
in the latter half of the twentieth, and by then biomedicalization in the twenty-first 
century, is best thought of as a historically contingent shift constituted by economic 
and technological transformations, rather than some unchallengeable truth.11 
Nonetheless, today, health is generally conceptualized in highly technical, 
individualistic terms in Western societies, and in turn, the functioning of health 
systems is largely exiled from democratic deliberation to insulated islands of 
professional expertise, whether economic calculations of costs and benefits or 
clinical medicine. As a result, health and health systems are more complex to 
theorize in terms of democracy than civil rights, or even other social rights such as 
education,12 notwithstanding that more than half of the countries in the world have 
recognized the right to health in domestic constitutional law, through incorporation 
of international law, or both.13 
Moreover, scholarship and advocacy around the international right to health 
or “human rights-based approaches to health” often focus on programming 
regarding a specific area of health, such as reproductive, maternal, and child 
health;14 while critically important, this does not engage with necessary 
discussions of priorities and trade-offs in a democracy. Likewise, the growing 
international human rights literature on “global health governance” has tended to 
focus on how globalization has “upended national human rights implementation, 
shifting the protection and promotion of human rights from national governments 
to global institutions.”15 In turn, many scholars have proposed a bureaucratic, top-
down version of “human rights implementation,”16 which takes a formal and 
 
 10. See generally Vicente Navarro, Production and the Welfare State: The Political Context of 
Reforms, 21 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 585 (1991). 
 11. See generally BIOMEDICALIZATION: TECHNOSCIENCE, HEALTH, AND ILLNESS IN THE U.S. 
(Adele E. Clarke et al. eds., 2010); Viviane Quirke & Jean-Paul Gaudillière, The Era of Biomedicine: 
Science, Medicine, and Public Health in Britain and France After the Second World War, 52 MED. 
HIST. 441 (2008). 
 12. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to 
Education (Article 13 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999). 
 13. See A Constitutional Right to Health Care: Many Countries Have It, but Not the U.S., 
SCIENCEDAILY (July 19, 2013), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/07 /130719104927.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EC66-H627]. 
 14. Flavia Bustreo & Curtis Doebbler, Universal Health Coverage: Are We Losing Our Way 
on Women’s and Children’s Health? 21 J. HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 229 (2019). 
 15. Benjamin Mason Meier & Lawrence O. Gostin, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL 
HEALTH: RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZING WORLD, at xxiii (Benjamin Mason Meier 
& Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2018); cf. JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE AND 
GOVERNANCE (2018). 
 16. For a broader critique of international human rights law as antidemocratic, see generally 
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1739 (2009). 
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positivistic approach to international human rights law, and fails to illuminate the 
connections between the right to health and democratic contestation. 
In suggesting an alternative socio-legal narrative, the Article proceeds as 
follows. First, in Part I, beginning with the idea that the central challenge in a plural 
democracy is the negotiation of difference among subjects of equal dignity,17 we 
conceptualize health as a moral and legal right, and argue that this 
conceptualization challenges conventional thinking in biomedicine and public 
health.18 Drawing on examples relating to disability rights, women’s sexual and 
reproductive health rights, and trans people’s rights in health, we note the ways in 
which understanding health as a democratic right deepens our understanding of 
heterogeneity in a plural democracy. 
In Part II, we examine the implications of treating health as a right for the 
primary institution responsible for preventive and curative health care: the health 
system. The way health systems are currently conceived in much of the world 
obscures how health is largely a product of social structures and relations, not just 
individual behaviors or biological pathogens. There is no reason for health systems 
not to be analyzed and interrogated in the same ways as other core social 
institutions—such as justice and educational systems—which mediate between 
different interests in society, and reinforce (or fail to do so) normative 
commitments such as dignity and equality. For example, just as the U.S. criminal 
justice system reinforces racial injustice, the gaping disparities in maternal 
mortality ratios between white and African American women (approximately one-
to-four)19 in the United States can be understood not just as lapses in quality of 
care but as the health system inscribing racial subordination on the bodies of 
women of color. We examine what it means to treat health systems as fundamental 
to shaping democratic norms, in terms of financing, priority-setting, the 
organization and delivery of services, information, and oversight. 
In Part III, we address the cosmopolitan implications for health rights of 
today’s globalized world where neither people nor determinants of health are 
contained within borders. Rather than shift the locus of attention in standard-
setting and policymaking to global bureaucracies, we suggest that nascent 
initiatives relating to extraterritorial obligations (ETOs) of states can be used to 
extend social contracts and strengthen regulations that have implications for global 
equity in health and beyond. We conclude by asserting that making explicit the 
links between health and deliberative democracy has the potential to re-focus 
 
 17. Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY 
AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 68 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). 
 18. NANCY KRIEGER, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND THE PEOPLE’S HEALTH: THEORY AND CONTEXT 126 
(2011). 
 19. Mary Beth Flanders-Stepans, Alarming Racial Differences in Maternal Mortality, 9 J. 
PERINATAL EDUC. 50 (2000). 
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struggles for health and social equality in ways that should not only inform efforts 
to reform health systems, but also reshape our understanding of health rights more 
broadly.20 
I. CONCEPTUALIZING HEALTH IN TERMS OF MORAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS WITHIN 
A DEMOCRACY 
A. Grounding the Moral Right to Health 
John Rawls argued that justice requires the arrangement of major political and 
social institutions in such a way as to maximize the equality of primary goods 
because this is essential to enabling terms of fair cooperation and equality of 
diversely situated people.21 Primary social goods include civil liberties and 
political rights, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect, which are 
self-evidently affected by the legal and institutional frameworks in a society. 
In his initial work, Rawls considered health not as a social good, but rather as 
a “natural” good, more akin to intelligence.22 However, an abundance of empirical 
evidence has emerged in recent decades that demonstrates that the distributions of 
health and ill-health are deeply influenced by “social determinants”—the 
“conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work, and age”23—which are 
invariably shaped by the arrangements of institutions in a society. Further, the 
health system itself, responsible for preventive measures, such as vaccinations, as 
well as curative treatment, is itself a social determinant of health. In extending 
Rawls’ theory of justice to health, Norman Daniels has noted the extent to which 
patterns of health and ill-health are shaped by structural and institutional factors.24 
Daniels in turn argues that health should be subject to the demands of justice 
because it is essential to enabling people to preserve a normal range of 
opportunities in life. 
Similarly, Amartya Sen has argued that we can claim a moral right to health 
because (1) health is essential for people to have the capability to exercise the 
functionings they value in life, and (2) health is subject to a considerable degree of 
social influence.25 Further, in both cases, these opportunities and capabilities are 
 
 20. For a detailed discussion of construction of these linkages, see generally ALICIA E. YAMIN, 
WHEN MISFORTUNE BECOMES INJUSTICE: EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLES FOR HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL EQUALITY (2020) [hereinafter MISFORTUNE]. 
 21. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A Theory of Justice 58–59 (1971). 
 22. Id. at 60–142. 
 23. WHO COMM’N ON SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, CLOSING THE GAP IN A GENERATION: 
HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 26 (2008). 
 24. See NORMAN DANIELS, Three Questions of Justice, in JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH 
NEEDS FAIRLY 11 (2007). 
 25. See generally Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
315 (2004). 
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not exercised in a vacuum; health enables people to participate as full and equal 
members of their polities. Both theories depend on the understanding that: (1) 
health has special moral value that sets it apart from an ordinary commodity (which 
could be allocated purely by the market); and (2) health is not merely a “natural” 
gift, nor a stochastic individual biological state, but rather is deeply influenced by 
the social and institutional arrangements in society. 
Further, both theories are consistent with broader theories of distributive 
justice that call for deliberative processes to specify how to meet the health needs 
of diverse groups of people fairly when all health needs invariably cannot be met 
in rich or poor societies alike. Indeed, health may be the quintessential illustration 
of the most pressing challenge to plural democracy, which is the legitimate 
negotiation of difference. As Seyla Benhabib argues, democracy is better thought 
of not as a rigid form of government but rather “a model for organizing the 
collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of society on the 
basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can 
be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among 
individuals considered as moral and political equals.”26 
It is important to underscore that this view of health as inextricably connected 
to dignity, justice, and the arrangement of institutions in a democracy, which 
underpins understanding health as both a moral and legal right, contrasts 
dramatically with how health is construed in biomedical research, clinical practice, 
and public health programming. When a physician evaluates one’s health using 
laboratory testing, health is defined as being within the “normal” range for a 
complete blood count, a liver function test, or a metabolic panel—i.e., the absence 
of disease or infirmity, or more broadly, the absence of pathology. This “negative” 
definition of health within biomedicine is simultaneously (1) abstracted from 
social context (and therefore permits standardization in research and classification 
of disease); and (2) susceptible to determination only through a specialized 
scientific expertise.27 Further, as Nancy Krieger, a leading social epidemiologist, 
has noted, the biomedical model focuses on determinants of disease amenable to 
intervention through medical care in individual patients; it “considers social 
determinants of disease to be at best secondary (if not irrelevant), and views 
populations simply as the sum of individuals and population patterns of disease as 
simply reflective of individual cases.”28 Conventional public health, in turn, 
operates through an inexorably utilitarian calculus that aggregates individual 
conditions to arrive at population burdens of disease, and compares cost-
effectiveness among different interventions. 
 
 26. Benhabib, supra note 17, at 68. 
 27. See generally MISFORTUNE, supra note 20. 
 28. KRIEGER, supra note 18, at 137. 
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B. Definition and Scope of a Legal Right to Health in International Law 
The special moral importance of health, as with all rights, is fundamentally 
connected to dignity and self-governance in the modern human rights canon.29 
Every country in the world, including the United States, has recognized at least 
some dimension of rights regarding health under international law.30 Further, 
sometimes the domestic legal recognition of health-related rights is achieved 
through non-discrimination, protections of bodily integrity, or an increasingly 
expanded conception of the right to life in international law and in domestic 
jurisprudence.31 Moreover, international law functions not merely through 
domestication of ratified treaties, but also through more diffuse standard-setting 
and moral persuasion created when sovereign heads of nation states relinquish 
some of their powers to join with the commonwealth of nations in recognizing 
common standards of conduct.32 These common supranational standards of 
conduct, as well as the obligations that they entail, evolve over time in recursive 
relation with the particularities of specific national contexts and constitutional 
orders. 
In 1946, the preamble to the World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution 
was the first mention of a right to health in international law, explicitly rejecting 
the idea that health is “merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”33 The core 
formulation of the right to health in international human rights treaty law was set 
forth in Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which identifies the “right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”34 
Under this formulation, the right to health encompasses both underlying public 
health conditions (e.g., water and sanitation) and “conditions which would assure 
to all medical service and medical attention” and is subject to progressive 
achievement in accordance with resource availability.35 In keeping with the notion 
that it enables us to preserve a range of opportunities, the right to health is not 
 
 29. See UDHR, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 30. OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT 
SHEET NO. 31: THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 1 (2008). 
 31. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
2, 14, opened for signature Nov. 11, 1950, E.T.S. 5; Ctr. for Legal Res. ex rel Câmpeanu v. Romania, 
2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 
(2018); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Elisabeth de Blok et al. v. 
the Netherlands, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/57/D/36/2012 (Mar. 24, 2014). 
 32. Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 154 (2003). 
 33. Constitution of the World Health Organization, pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 
62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 186. 
 34. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 12. 
 35. Id. art. 12(2)(d); see generally General Comment No. 14, supra note 6. 
9
Yamin and Boghosian: Democracy and Health: Situating Health Rights within a Republic o
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
DEMOCRACY AND HEALTH 
105 
merely a package of good and services; under international law, the right to health 
includes both freedoms (e.g. informed consent and freedom from coercion) and 
entitlements to goods, facilities and services.36 
Equal protection of the law is perhaps the foundational principle in a plural 
democracy, and non-discrimination is understood as a cross-cutting principle 
underlying the right to health, as well as other economic, social and cultural (ESC) 
rights under international law.37 The Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, which the United States has ratified, raises the need to eradicate 
discrimination in relation to rights to “public health, medical care, social security 
and social services.”38 The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) mandates that states “take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, 
including those related to family planning.”39 CEDAW also places a particular 
focus on rural women, acknowledging that categories of protected groups often 
mask intra-group differences.40 
The overarching importance of non-discrimination in health is two-fold. First, 
formal non-discrimination requires similarly situated people to be treated similarly 
under the law, implying that services accessible to one person should not be denied 
to another with the same condition based on race, gender, caste, etc.41 Second, 
international law goes beyond much U.S. constitutional law in that substantive 
non-discrimination requires treating differently situated people in ways that enable 
their equal effective enjoyment of rights, including the right to health.42 
Conceptualizing health rights in terms of the distributional consequences that legal 
rules have upon diverse populations has been extremely important in building the 
normative scaffolding of the right to health under much constitutional and 
international law. Laws and policies that arbitrarily distinguish between groups, or 
alternatively formalistically fail to identify real differences between groups, can 
be—and have been—reformulated to afford equal effective enjoyment. 
 
 36. General Comment No. 14, supra note 6. 
 37. Non-discrimination is considered a principle in the ICESCR and is a substantive right in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 38. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 
5(e)(IV), opened for signature Dec. 21. 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 39. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 12, ¶ 
1, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 40. Id. art. 14(2)(b). 
 41. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20 (2009) on Non-
discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2. of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (2009). 
 42. Id. 
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For example, in a 2019 decision from the First Chamber, the Mexican 
Supreme Court held that a woman’s right to health under the Mexican Constitution 
and international law was violated when she was denied a medically necessary 
abortion due to severe threats to her health.43 The Court phrased this violation in 
specifically gendered terms—that the plaintiff “was prevented from having prompt 
and timely access to a health service that only women need with the consequent 
impairment of her right to the highest possible level of health and wellbeing.”44 
The Court reinforced that ensuring women’s right to health necessarily requires 
both individual and systemic action “to avoid the historical disadvantage due to 
sex or gender from adversely affecting legitimate claims of justice.”45 
The integral nature of non-discrimination to a right to health calls into 
question the ways in which health systems foster discriminatory norms that 
differentiate between and hierarchize subgroups within society.46 Indeed, what is 
most potentially transformative about addressing health as a right is that it forces 
us to re-evaluate the multiple layers of heterogeneity in our democratic institutions 
and broader democracies.47 This is particularly true for those who are not white, 
able-bodied, cisgender men—the assumed subject upon which both medical 
knowledge and many laws are premised,48 as described below in relation to 
disability, women’s reproductive health and obstetric care, and trans persons’ 
rights in health. 
C. Transformative Implications of Navigating Democratic Difference through 
 
 43. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Primera Sala [Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Nation, First House] 2019, Amparo en Revisión 1388/2015 ¶¶ 96–109, 150 (May 15, 2019) (Mex.), 
https://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=190811 
[https://perma.cc/N52C-AZ3R], translated in Motion for Constitutional Relief Under Amparo 
Proceedings in Review 1388/2015, PETRIE-FLOM CENTER FOR HEALTH LAW POLICY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOETHICS ¶¶ 51–64, 105, https://petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/assets
/publications/AR_1388-2015._Tradux_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V792-292X] [hereinafter 
Amparo en Revisión 1388/2015]. 
 44. Id. ¶ 137 (¶ 92 in the translation). 
 45. Id. ¶ 62 (¶ 22 in the translation). 
 46. See Didier Fassin, Another Politics of Life is Possible, 26 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 44 
(2009). 
 47. Cf. Bustreo & Doebbler, supra note 14. 
 48. Indeed, only in 1993 was the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act passed, which 
mandated that National Institutes of Health-funded clinical trials include women and minorities. 
Since then, progress in centering these groups in medical research has been slow. See MARY 
HORRIGAN CONNORS CTR. FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH & GENDER BIOLOGY AT BRIGHAM & WOMEN’S 
HOSP., SEX-SPECIFIC MEDICAL RESEARCH: WHY WOMEN’S HEALTH CAN’T WAIT 3 (2014). 
11
Yamin and Boghosian: Democracy and Health: Situating Health Rights within a Republic o
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020




The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) defines 
disability as a person’s “long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”49 Further, Article 
9 of the CRPD requires states to engage in “identification and elimination of 
obstacles and barriers to accessibility.”50 This definition of disability moves away 
from a focus on an individual’s biological health state, by conceptualizing 
disability as the interaction between an individual, their long-term impairment, and 
their surroundings. Article 25 of the CRPD provides “that persons with disabilities 
have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health without 
discrimination on the basis of disability” and “that States Parties shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure access for persons with disabilities to health 
services that are gender-sensitive, including health-related rehabilitation.”51 This 
duty may include the provision of special measures to ensure effective enjoyment 
of health rights in practice.52 
The CRPD forces us to consider how the prevailing utilitarian public health 
paradigm of “species-typical functioning” evident in public health metrics such as 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) are predicated on devaluing the lives of 
disabled persons.53 Under a DALY framework, health interventions for disabled 
people are calculated as having less impact on alleviating overall disease burden, 
based on the initial assumption that a disabled person is less functioning than an 
 
 49. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 30, 
2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD]. 
 50. Id. art. 9. 
 51. Id. art. 25. 
 52. In Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG), Canada’s Supreme Court held that the province had 
violated two patients’ right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of disability under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when they were treated during childbirth despite the 
communication barrier between themselves and the medical professionals, leading to them receiving 
“medical services that are inferior to those received by the hearing population.” The Court wrote, 
“Given the central place of good health in the quality of life of all persons in our society, the provision 
of substandard medical services to the deaf necessarily diminishes the overall quality of their lives.” 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 ¶ 94. In that case, which was decided before 
the CRPD entered into force, the Court created an entitlement for deaf patients to have access to a 
sign language interpreter during hospital care that enables them to communicate with healthcare 
providers and thus meaningfully participate in decisions relating to their health care. 
 53. Michael Ashley Stein, Janet E. Lord & Dorothy Weiss Tolchin, Equal Access to Health 
Care Under UN Disability Rights Convention, in MEDICINE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS ON THE 
DISTRIBUTION ON HEALTH CARE 246–247 (Rosamond Rhodes, Margaret Battin, & Anita Silvers eds., 
2012). 
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able-bodied/minded person, and therefore cannot be restored to full functionality 
even if they receive a health intervention for other conditions that the disabled 
person may be experiencing. Using this model to calculate the cost-effectiveness 
of introducing different health interventions leads to the unjust outcome that a 
disabled or chronically ill person who is already “disadvantaged in general . . . 
receives less medical attention for other ailments.” This model also implies that 
this disabled person may very well not merit other efforts to diminish the impacts 
of impairments (e.g., changing sidewalks and bathrooms to allow for wheelchairs 
or providing equal access to learning materials for visually and hearing impaired 
persons).54 As Sudhir Anand and Kara Hanson have written, “[a] more appropriate 
measure of burden of disease must take account of the way in which individual 
and social resources can compensate for the level of disability experienced.”55 
The CRPD challenges us to focus on the complex interplay between a person 
with impairments of some kind and her environment in determining her ability to 
participate fully in her society.56 To be clear: this does not mean that highly costly 
health-related interventions for persons with disabilities always take priority over 
more cost-effective measures that would impact a broader segment of society. 
However, a right to health does imply the need to accord diverse groups of people 
equal moral consideration through a deliberative process, giving due regard to the 
values of those most impacted as well as the broader democratic polity, rather than 
automatically opting for the “biggest bang for the buck.” 
Moreover, the CRPD’s transformative implications also highlight the ways in 
which we understand informed consent and dignity in health systems. Article 3(4) 
mandates “[r]espect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as 
part of human diversity and humanity,”57 which makes clear that the goal of the 
CRPD is not to equalize individualized health states, but to challenge liberal 
democracies to adapt to different forms of otherness in order to ensure persons 
with disabilities can participate fully and equally in their societies regardless of 
their health state. That is, their “defects” need not be fixed in order for them to 
participate on an equal basis in their communities and societies. 
Indeed, Article 12 of the CRPD on legal capacity, as interpreted in General 
Comment 1 of the CRPD Committee, suggests a new model of “supported 
decision-making” as opposed to “substitute decision-making” for people with 
mental disabilities.58 As the CRPD Committee elaborates, a regime of supported 
 
 54. Amartya Sen, Why Health Equity? 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 659, 662 (2002). 
 55. Sudhir Anand & Kara Hanson, Disability-Adjusted Life Years: A Critical Review, 16 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 685, 694 (1997). 
 56. Sophie Mitra, The Human Development Model of Disability, Health, and Wellbeing, in 
DISABILITY, HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 9 (2018). 
 57. CRPD art. 3(4). 
 58. CRPD, supra note 49, See generally Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
General Comment No. 1 (2014) on Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, U.N. Doc. 
13
Yamin and Boghosian: Democracy and Health: Situating Health Rights within a Republic o
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
DEMOCRACY AND HEALTH 
109 
decision-making “comprises various support options which give primacy to a 
person’s will and preferences and respect human rights norms” and avoids 
overregulation of the lives of persons with disabilities.59 In many existing legal 
regimes, once a medical expert deems a person to be incapable of making their 
own decisions, a legal guardian is appointed who is able to overrule the 
incapacitated person’s will and preferences with what is “perceived as being in his 
or her objective best interests.”60 
The supported decision-making framework of consent thus presents a 
fundamental challenge to the specialized knowledge of psychiatrists and other 
clinicians.61 The CRPD Committee notes: “Mental capacity is not, as is commonly 
presented, an objective, scientific and naturally occurring phenomenon. Mental 
capacity is contingent on social and political contexts, as are the disciplines, 
professions and practices which play a dominant role in assessing mental 
capacity.”62 Given that assessments of mental capacity are generally performed 
according to psychiatric “methods” that are inaccessible to laypersons (and carers 
who are not trained in scientifically accepted models of mental healthcare), 
supported decision-making and the broader disability rights paradigm behind the 
CRPD imply a tectonic shift in the ways in which a health system legitimately 
exercises power over human beings. Involuntary treatment of persons with psycho-
social disabilities would require a different process of justification beyond the 
proverbial “second opinion” if supported decision-making were effectuated in 
practice. Further, the “effectiveness” of supported decision-making cannot be 
evaluated in short-term health outcomes alone, but also by whether persons with 
psycho-social disabilities are able to exercise agency without having to be re-
hospitalized, incarcerated, or otherwise subjected to state confinement and control 
during a certain period.63 
 
CRPD/C/GC/1 (2014). [hereinafter CRPD General Comment No. 1]. 
 59. CRPD General Comment No. 1, supra note 58, ¶ 29. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See P. Gooding, Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its 
Implications for Mental Health Law, 20 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 431 (2013); cf. M. Scholten & 
J. Gather, Adverse Consequences of Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities for Persons with Mental Disabilities and an Alternative Way Forward, 44 J. MED. ETHICS 
226 (2018). 
 62. CRPD General Comment No. 1, supra note 58, ¶¶ 14-15. 
 63. For example, one indicator could be the rate and demographics of people who are 
involuntarily committed. See Jeffrey Swanson et al., Racial Disparities in Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment: Are They Real? 28 HEALTH AFF. 816, 816 (2009) (“Overall, African Americans are 
more likely than whites to be involuntarily committed for outpatient psychiatric care in New York.”); 
see also Florian Hotzy et al., Cross-Cultural Notions of Risk and Liberty: A Comparison of 
Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization and Outpatient Treatment in New York, United States and 
Zurich, Switzerland, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY 1 (2018) (discussing how New York and Zurich have 
different cultures with regard to involuntary hospitalization and concluding that New York’s culture 
focuses more on the “danger” of untreated mentally ill persons). 
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2. Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Health 
All persons who can become pregnant need to be able to make active choices 
in regard to their sexual and reproductive choices and health, not just to passively 
receive reproductive health care services. As a result of their socially constructed 
roles in reproduction, women’s control over their reproductive choices and 
processes is a fundamental part of being able to participate as equal members of 
society. As recognized in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(CESCR) General Comment 22, “[t]he right of women to sexual and reproductive 
health is indispensable to their autonomy and their right to make meaningful 
decisions about their lives and health.”64 Women require equal access to health 
facilities, goods, and services, and as recognized by the CEDAW Committee and 
CESCR, equal enjoyment of the right to health sometimes entails access to 
“additional” services, such as essential obstetric care.65 
Deciding the number and spacing of children is a fundamental part of 
women’s self-governance;66 laws and policies that curtail that agency in the name 
of demographic imperatives enshrine political discourses that women are less than 
fully equal subjects of rights. This principle of women’s inherent dignity to make 
sexual and reproductive health choices undergirds the decisions by many national 
and supranational courts that have found that involuntary sterilization violates not 
only women’s right to health, but also dignity and bodily integrity.67 Involuntary 
sterilization is often systematically conducted on women from marginalized 
groups—such as women with disabilities or HIV, or certain ethnicities or social 
groups—yet they are frequently cloaked in medical justifications and health 
systems that structure medical judgments as unchallengeable.68 While the health 
effects resulting from these injustices may be the same, health rights advocates and 
courts fail to highlight issues of democratic inequality and exclusion when they 
frame these issues narrowly as violations of individual bodily integrity, 
disconnected from the effects on the agency of women within a plural social 
 
 64. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the 
Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (2016). 
 65. Id.; General Comment No. 14, supra note 6; Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 20th and 21st Sessions, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999). 
 66. And persons of all genders who gestate. 
 67. See, e.g., Government of the Republic of Namibia v. LM and Others (SA 49/2012), 2014 
NASC 19 (Nov. 3, 2014) (Namib.); I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 (Nov. 30, 2016), request for interpretation of 
judgement denied, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 336 (May 25, 2017); V.C. v. Slovakia, 2011-V 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 381. 
 68. Alicia Ely Yamin & Corey Prachniak-Rincón, Compounded Injustice and Cautionary 
Notes for “Progress” in the Sustainable Development Era: Considering the Case of Sterilization of 
Women Living with HIV, 41. HARV. J.L. & GENDER 396 (2018). 
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context. For example, in Government of the Republic of Namibia v. LM and Others, 
the Supreme Court of Namibia condemned the attitude of medical paternalism that 
led to the involuntary sterilization in the case, but failed to appreciate that this 
abuse is disproportionately rendered upon women who are marginalized in 
Namibian society by their HIV status.69 “Intersectional discrimination,” as coined 
originally by Kimberlé Crenshaw, requires us to recognize how different and 
overlapping forms of difference inhibit women’s exercise of their health rights—
and all democratic rights—in complex ways that require us to (1) pay attention to 
the lived experiences of diverse women; and (2) understand the contextually 
contingent ways in which the health system reinforces patterns of exclusion of 
particular groups that exist in the overall society.70 
Sexual and reproductive health and rights scholars and activists in Latin 
America have further challenged the prevalent ways that health systems, by being 
structured around the biomedical paradigm, constrain the agency of women (and 
other pregnant persons). Activists have argued that women are not only entitled to 
protection against lack of informed consent and obvious “disrespect and abuse” in 
receiving reproductive healthcare.71 Rather, they call for a recognition of “obstetric 
violence,” a concept now codified in legislation in a number of countries in Latin 
America,72 which constitutes an epistemic change that draws into question medical 
practices from episiotomies to unnecessary caesarean sections.73 Rachelle 
Chadwick has identified how the concept of obstetric violence gains its “disruptive 
and radical edge” from its willingness to name forms of violence that have 
historically been “hidden and unacknowledged,” such as emotional and structural 
violence.74 The struggles against obstetric violence are not about health states per 
se, such as reducing maternal mortality and morbidity. Obstetric violence 
 
 69. Government of the Republic of Namibia, ¶¶ 104-106. 
 70. Yamin & Prachniak-Rincón, supra note 68, at 410 (citing Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping 
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241 (1991) (introducing the theory of intersectionality of race, gender, and other forms of 
discrimination)). 
 71. Prevention and Elimination of Disrespect and Abuse During Childbirth, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (2019), https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/maternal_perinatal/statement-
childbirth-data/en [https://perma.cc/DL97-BCEE]. 
 72. C.R. Williams, C. Jerez, K. Klein, M. Correa, J.J. Belizán & G. Cormick, Obstetric 
Violence: a Latin American Legal Response to Mistreatment During Childbirth, 125 BJOG: INT’L J. 
OF OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1208 (2018). For example, Argentina’s Comprehensive Law for 
the Sanction, Prevention, and Eradication of Violence against Women defines reproductive processes 
broadly, as including as pregnancy, labor work, childbirth, and post-partum periods. Law No. 26485, 
Apr. 14, 2009, BOLETÍN OFICIAL [B.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] no. 31632, at 1, 3 (citing Law No. 25929, 
Sept. 21, 2004, B.O. no. 30489, at 1, 1). 
 73. Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, Obstetric Violence: A New Framework for Identifying Challenges 
to Maternal Healthcare in Argentina, 24 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS, May 2016, at 65. 
 74. Rachelle Chadwick, Ambiguous Subjects: Obstetric Violence, Assemblage and South 
African Birth Narratives, 27 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 489, 492 (2017). 
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encapsulates the more subtle—yet still damaging—regulation of women as 
embodied social beings in a democracy. By pathologizing women’s natural 
reproductive processes, pregnancy is treated as a “disease” and women’s bodies 
are reduced to objects on which “expert” medical interventions are deployed. 
In Killing the Black Body, Dorothy Roberts has described the historical and 
present use of obstetric violence to police Black women’s reproduction in the 
United States. While Black women’s bodies were literally the mechanisms to 
reproduce white property under slavery, obstetric violence against Black women 
has more recently also been funneled through progressive medical advances such 
as oral and vaccine contraceptives.75 For example, although birth control in the 
twentieth century was being disproportionately pushed onto Black women with the 
intention of reducing their birthrate based on racist and even eugenic narratives, 
services such as affordable and quality prenatal care were not similarly made 
widely available to Black women.76 As Roberts argues, such obstetric violence is 
not only harmful because it leads to different reproductive outcomes for Black 
women, but also because these narratives serve the ideological function of making 
“racial inequality appear to be the product of nature rather than power.”77 Obstetric 
violence “thus acts as a mode of discipline that is inextricably intertangled with 
multiple axes of social marginalization.”78 In contrast, when diverse women’s lived 
experiences of their sexuality and bodies are taken into account through the naming 
of obstetric violence and the demand for redress, the univocal authority of the 
medical establishment to act upon the Black female body is challenged, and the 
ways in which racial inequality is constructed become visible. The end result is a 
challenge to the way in which the power to categorize people, construct difference, 
and establish social hierarchies is exercised through health systems and refracted 
throughout society. 
3. Trans People’s Rights in Health 
Yet another example of how conceiving of the right to health as having the 
goal of enabling people to live with dignity in a plural society—as opposed to 
attaining a specific individual health state—is acutely illustrated in situations faced 
by trans and gender-nonconforming people. In the biomedical paradigm, these 
persons have generally been treated as having disorders, such as “gender 
dysphoria.”79 Yet in a ground-breaking case, National Legal Services Authority v. 
 
 75. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING 
OF LIBERTY 113–57 (1997). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 111. 
 78. Chadwick, supra note 74, at 493. 
 79. Jules Morgan, Trans* Health: “Diversity, not Pathology,” 2 LANCET 124 (2015); Zowie 
Davy & Michael Toze, What is Gender Dysphoria? A Critical Systematic Narrative Review, 3 
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Union of India, the Supreme Court of India recognized that there are divergences 
between dignity and medically-accepted health statuses.80 The Court held that legal 
recognition of trans identity as a third category of gender identity is central to 
upholding the human rights and dignity of trans people in India. Moreover, the 
Court emphasized that legal recognition of this gender identity is based on the 
person’s own gender expression, and is not contingent on gender reassignment 
surgery, hormones, or other medical procedures.81 Further, it called for local 
governments to take steps to provide gender-sensitive medical care as well as 
separate bathroom facilities for trans persons.82 In other countries, such legal 
reforms have been undertaken through public deliberation and legislation. In 
Argentina, the 2012 Gender Identity Law allowed for people to choose the name 
and gender listed on their identity documents without the need for a psychological 
or medical evaluation, and included sex reassignment treatment in the national 
health program.83 Similarly, in 2013, the Dutch legislature voted to pass a bill 
allowing trans people to change their gender on identity documents without having 
to undergo hormones and surgery.84 Thus, dignity and participation in society need 
not be predicated on access to procedures to attain a specific biomedically-defined 
outcome. 
Just as in disability, the right to health does not automatically mean that trans 
persons should obtain all treatments they seek; it requires that their concerns be 
treated with equal concern and respect in the decision-making process. In AC v. 
Berkshire West Primary Care Trust, a case arising in the United Kingdom, the 
non-statutory citizens’ committee reviewing petitions for care rejected a trans 
woman’s request to fund a breast enlargement surgery to supplement her hormone 
treatment.85 The National Health Service rejected her request on the basis that cis 
women would not be entitled to funding for a procedure that was classified as 
“cosmetic” and not medically necessary.86 This decision was upheld by the 
citizens’ committee, and later by a court. The court decision adopts a biomedical 
 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH 159 (2018). 
 80. Nat’l Legal Serv. Auth. v Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 (India). 
 81. Id. ¶ 129(2). 
 82. Id. ¶ 129(6). 
 83. Law No. 26743, May 24, 2012, B.O. no. 32404, at 2; Breaking Down Barriers to 




 84. Wet van 18 december 2013, Stb. 2014, no. 1; The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender 
Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/netherlands-
victory-transgender-rights [https://perma.cc/LV7H-CGF7]. 
 85. AC v. Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162 (Admin), aff’d, [2011] 
EWCA Civ 247. 
 86. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. 
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view of “gender identity disorder” and relies heavily on “expert” medical opinion, 
largely ignoring the strong dignity and security interests at play for trans women 
seeking to change their appearance to conform with their gender identity. On the 
other hand, a contrary ruling granting the breast enhancement surgery at 
government expense may have reinforced stereotyped views of how women’s 
bodies should appear and suggested that dignity is contingent upon conforming to 
a stereotyped conception of femaleness.87 As discussed in Part II, it is precisely 
because arguments about substantive equality and dignity in relation to health are 
invariably deeply contested, in law as well as the financing of health systems, that 
it is essential that these arguments be subjected to public scrutiny and deliberative 
practices, such as through both the citizens’ committee and the court. 
In short, asserting health as a legal right changes the causal factors that we 
consider in relation to health states, from purely biological pathogens to social 
contexts and the legal rules that shape those social contexts. In turn, it must change 
the way we evaluate programs and progress. That is, we are concerned not merely 
with the number of deliveries or psychiatric treatments. If human rights are to be 
used effectively to foster democratic institutions and practices with respect to 
health, we are interested in the dynamic interaction between embodied social 
beings and their environment, including democratic institutions and socio-political 
discourses. We understand intuitively that the right to food requires access to 
adequate nutrition, but is not violated by individual choices to fast, nor captured 
by disaggregated calorie or protein measures. Similarly, promoting health rights in 
ways that strengthen democratic practices cannot be reduced to pasting equity 
indicators onto standard health outcomes. Understanding the application of human 
rights in health in this narrow way invariably consigns it to palliative measures, 
which disregard the connections to broader dignity and equality concerns of 
differently situated people. Rather, advancing health rights requires engaging with 
the far more complex arguments regarding what is required in a democracy for 
human beings with diverse socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, gender, and other 
identities—and widely divergent health needs and conditions—to receive equal 
moral consideration both within health systems and the larger society. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ORGANIZING HEALTH SYSTEMS AROUND HEALTH 
RIGHTS 
There is overwhelming evidence that social determinants of health are 
 
 87. For scholarship discussing the politics of passing within the trans community, see, for 
example, Katrina Roen, “Either/Or” and “Both/Neither”: Discursive Tensions in Transgender 
Politics, 27 SIGNS 501 (2001); C. Riley Snorton, “A New Hope”: The Psychic Life of Passing, 24 
HYPATIA 77 (2009); Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, in THE 
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 221 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006). 
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responsible for a far larger portion of the unequal distribution of morbidity and 
mortality than medical care.88 However, the health system itself is a social 
determinant, and acts in synergy with other social determinants. The WHO defines 
a health system as “all organizations, people and actions whose primary intent is 
to promote, restore or maintain health. This includes efforts to influence 
determinants of health as well as more direct health-improving activities.”89 As 
COVID-19 has unfolded, for example, it has become increasingly clear how the 
patchwork structure of the United States medical care system, and lack of public 
health systems, reinforces marginalization and risk among the most vulnerable.90 
As Wendy Parmet has written, “health law has helped to fashion a health care 
system that lacks the redundancy and resiliency that will be critical in a 
pandemic.”91 A “crisis” approach to pandemics will never be as effective as a 
health and legal system that “recognizes that health care itself is a public health 
issue.”92 In the United States, health insurance is far from universal—in 2018, 
8.5% of U.S. residents (27.5 million people) had no health insurance at any point 
that year.93 The overall result in the midst of this pandemic has been that low-
income people, designated as “essential workers,” continue to go to work at jobs 
that often involve high levels of public contact or alternatively risk economic ruin, 
due to how the economy writ large and the health system are structured.94 That is, 
 
 88. See, e.g., Paul Braveman, Susan Egerter & David R. Williams, 32 The Social Determinants 
of Health: Coming of Age, 32 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 381 (2011); Nancy Krieger, Methods for the 
Scientific Study of Discrimination and Health: An Ecosocial Approach, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 936 
(2012); Leslie London, Chuma Himonga, Nicole Fick & Maria Stuttaford, Social Solidarity and the 
Right to Health: Essential Elements for People-Centered Health Systems, 30 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 
938 (2015); Michael Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 LANCET 1099 (2005); 
Michael Marmot & Jessica J. Allen, Social Determinants of Health Equity, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
S517 (2014); David Sanders, A Global Perspective on Health Promotion and the Social 
Determinants of Health, HEALTH PROMOTION J. AUSTL. 165 (2006). 
 89. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EVERYBODY’S BUSINESS: STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS TO 
IMPROVE HEALTH OUTCOMES—WHO’S FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 2 (2007). 
 90. See Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens 
Its Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15
/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/K3LV-N4DW]; Michael T. Osterholm 
& Mark Olshaker, Why We Are So Ill-Prepared for a Possible Pandemic Like Coronavirus, TIME 
(Feb. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5777923/america-prepared-pandemic-coronavirus [https://
perma.cc/H3XV-ZYM3]; The United States Leads in Coronavirus Cases, but Not Pandemic 
Response, SCIENCE (April 1, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/united-states-leads-
coronavirus-cases-not-pandemic-response [https://perma.cc/SL7U-Z78F]. 
 91. Wendy Parmet, Unprepared: Why Health Law Fails to Prepare Us for a Pandemic, 2 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 157, 160 (2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. EDWARD R. BERCHICK, JESSICA C. BARNETT & RACHEL D. UPTON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
P60-267 (RV), HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 2 (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-267.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4KX-5JLC]. 
 94. Of course, this reality is not limited to the United States. Revisiting the 2010 Marmot 
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rather than mitigating the social inequalities in U.S. society, the patchwork and 
marketized health system is amplifying the marginalization of already 
disadvantaged groups in this pandemic. 
Yet, in “normal” times, we reflect too little on the ways in which health 
systems reflect on democratic commitments, including through the regulation of 
diverse populations’ rates of birth, death, illness, fertility, and more.95 As noted 
above, the stark disparities in maternal mortality ratios between white and African 
American women in the United States96 have received heightened attention in the 
mainstream media in recent years.97 One response would be to treat this disparity 
solely as a quality of care issue to be fixed by technical checklists and protocols.98 
Another would be to underscore the truth that women of color still face the 
damaging health effects of the toxic interactions of racial, gender and class 
discrimination from the moment they are born in the United States.99 But it is 
 
Review on Health Equity in England in a new review in 2020, Michael Marmot and his coauthors 
sought to interrogate why after a century of increasing life expectancy in England, these increases 
had slowed dramatically, and why life expectancy in fact decreased among the most deprived 
populations in the country. While they could not conclusively attribute the drop to austerity, they 
wrote that any and all of the following factors were likely contributing: 
From rising child poverty and the closure of children’s centres, to declines in education funding, an 
increase in precarious work and zero hours contracts, to a housing affordability crisis and a rise in 
homelessness, to people with insufficient money to lead a healthy life and resorting to foodbanks in 
large numbers, to ignored communities with poor conditions and little reason for hope. And these 
outcomes, on the whole, are even worse for minority ethnic population groups and people with 
disabilities. 
MICHAEL MARMOT ET AL., HEALTH EQUITY IN ENGLAND: THE MARMOT REVIEW 10 YEARS ON 5 
(2020). Moreover, most of the concluding recommendations in the review were not focused narrowly 
on the health system, but advocated for increased social spending to improve employment, housing, 
and environmental conditions. Id. at 151. 
 95. See LYNN P. FREEDMAN ET AL., MILLENNIUM PROJECT TASK FORCE ON CHILD & MATERNAL 
HEALTH, WHO’S GOT THE POWER? TRANSFORMING HEALTH SYSTEMS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
(2005); Gunilla Backman et al., Health Systems and the Right to Health: an Assessment of 194 
Countries, 372 LANCET 2047 (2008); Lynn Freedman, Achieving the MDGs: Health Systems as Core 
Social Institutions, 48 DEVELOPMENT 19 (2005) [hereinafter Freedman, Achieving the MDGs]; Paul 
Hunt, The Human Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health: New Opportunities and 
Challenges, 100 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 603 (2006). 
 96. Flanders-Stepans, supra note 19. 
 97. Allyson Chiu, Beyoncé, Serena Williams Open up About Potentially Fatal Childbirths, a 




 98. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2009); cf. Kelly 
Grant, Surgical Checklists Have Little Effect on Patient Outcomes, Study Finds, GLOBE & MAIL 
(March 12, 2014), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/surgical-checklists-have-little-
effect-on-patient-outcomes-study-finds/article17473716 [https://perma.cc/B989-6FNQ]. 
 99. See generally Arline T. Geronimus et al., Do US Black Women Experience Stress-Related 
Accelerated Biological Aging? 21 HUM. NATURE 19 (2010); Arline T. Geronimus et al., Race-
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equally true, as Elizabeth Dawes Gay of Black Mamas Matter writes, that: 
Racial discrimination within the health-care setting is a modern 
problem built on the legacy of slavery, reproductive oppression, 
and control of medicine and black bodies . . . . Today racial 
discrimination in clinical care presents in a variety of ways. 
Research has shown that implicit racial bias may cause doctors to 
spend less time with black patients and that black people receive 
less-effective care. Doctors are also more likely to underestimate 
the pain of their black patients. And anecdotes of disrespect and 
mistreatment abound.100 
As has been underscored in the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. health system 
reinforces societal racism not just in the treatment individual Black patients may 
receive by practitioners at the micro-level, but through macro-level issues (e.g. 
financing) and meso-level issues (e.g. inadequacy of primary care). As these issues 
disproportionately affect people of color, the design and functioning of the health 
system treats racial difference in ways that undermine the equal concern and 
respect that is owed to diverse members of a democracy. 
Yet, in human rights scholarship and practice there has been little examination 
of the role of the health system—whether in the United States or elsewhere—in 
upholding or violating fundamental normative commitments in the same ways as, 
for example, the justice system. As Lynn Freedman writes, “Human rights activists 
have long understood the political arms of the state—prisons, judicial systems and 
police forces—to have the power to exclude, abuse and silence. But rarely are . . . 
the social institutions on which [health rights] depend approached with the same 
understanding.”101 
Here we aim to contribute to that understanding of the requirements for health 
systems to be organized around respecting, protecting and fulfilling the right to 
health within a democracy. Specifically, we consider implications for: (1) 
financing, (2) priority-setting, (3) information, and (4) judicial as well as other 
oversight of health systems. 
A. Fairness in Financing 
The right to health is subject to progressive achievement in accordance with 
 
Ethnicity, Poverty, Urban Stressors, and Telomere Length in a Detroit Community-Based Sample, 
56 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 199 (2015). 
 100. Elizabeth Dawes Gay, Serena Williams Could Insist that Doctors Listen to Her. Most Black 
Women Can’t, NATION (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/serena-williams-could-
insist-that-doctors-listen-to-her-most-black-women-cant [https://perma.cc/4F6M-NPXL]. 
 101. Freedman, Achieving the MDGs, supra note 95, at 20. 
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maximum available resources, as are all social rights under international law.102 
Under constitutional frameworks that recognize the right to health, it is also subject 
to constraints of resource availability. In reality, all rights require resources, 
including those conventionally thought of in the liberal state as “negative shields” 
against the incursion of the government. For example, consider the freedom from 
arbitrary detention, which requires appropriately allocated funding for justice 
institutions as well as regulatory oversight. Moreover, civil rights vary with 
resource availability across contexts; think of due process in Canada versus 
Cameroon. However, civil and political rights are generally funded through 
general taxation which both reflects their status as fundamental pillars of 
democracy and makes them less susceptible to marketization and outsourcing to 
non-governmental provision. 
Health goods and services, by contrast, are generally funded through 
combinations of general taxation, payroll taxes, and social and private insurance 
schemes, as well as by direct out-of-pocket payments. For health systems to 
function in ways that reaffirm democratic values of inclusion, solidarity, and 
equality, they require fair financing, including sufficient pooled resources to cover 
social and legal citizens.103 Just as it should be unacceptable in any democracy in 
the twenty-first century to allocate basic education by a price mechanism, so too is 
it undemocratic for essential health goods and services to be treated as mere 
commodities with no special moral value nor inextricable connection to dignity. 
Nonetheless, neoliberal policies that privilege market solutions encourage 
health systems to do exactly this across much of the world today. In David Sanders 
and Mickey Chopra’s case study of South Africa, they wrote, “The dominant 
global and national policy environment that prioritizes the market and the private 
sector discourages state spending on ‘unproductive’ social investment,” such as 
health. This policy environment “accounts largely for the continuing health and 
[well-being] inequities” in the country—and many other middle-income countries 
as well.104 As Ronald Dworkin aptly noted, a laissez-faire political economy “does 
not show equal concern for everyone. Anyone impoverished through that system 
is entitled to ask: ‘There are other, more regulatory and redistributive, sets of laws 
that would put me in a better position. How can [the] government claim that this 
system shows equal concern for me?’”105 
The extreme of an approach that treats health—and health care—as a 
 
 102. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2. 
 103. ALICIA ELY YAMIN, POWER, SUFFERING, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORKS FOR HEALTH AND WHY THEY MATTER 99-127 (2016). 
 104. David Sanders & Mickey Chopra, Key Challenges to Achieving Health for All in an 
Inequitable Society: The Case of South Africa, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 73 (2006). For another case 
study example, see Fran Baum et al., Comprehensive Primary Health Care Under Neo-Liberalism 
in Australia, 168 SOC. SCI. & MED. 43 (2016). 
 105. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 3 (2011). 
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commodity without sufficient oversight has led to egregious health and other 
human rights violations in Kenya, where the High Court recently found that the 
right to life and dignity of two women had been violated when they were detained 
by a hospital immediately after giving birth for being unable to pay medical fees.106 
But the inequities of market allocation of health care are not limited to poor or 
middle-income countries. For instance, in the United States, ostensibly “non-
profit” hospitals have brought hundreds of thousands of lawsuits to garnish the 
wages of uninsured, low-income patients for unpaid medical bills.107 Vicente 
Navarro argues that “the enormous power of corporate interests in both the media 
and the political process” has been a key contributing factor to the United States 
being the only developed country without guaranteed health care regardless of 
ability to pay.108 Indeed, even in the lead-up to the Affordable Care Act in 2008, 
lobbying by key healthcare industry players—such as pharmaceutical and 
insurance companies—constrained political debate on this option,109 
notwithstanding the high levels of popular support for single-payer healthcare at 
the time.110 In 2018, U.S. health spending absorbed 17.7% of GDP,111 and is 
expected to reach 19.9% of GDP by 2025.112 It is more per capita than comparable 
countries like Canada and Sweden.113 Moreover, as discussed above, this system 
involves starkly disparate access and outcomes along racial and income lines. Yet, 
as of this writing, significant reform in the financing of the largely private, market-
 
 106. M.A.O. v. Attorney General, [2015] eKLR (H.C.K. Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/131104 [https://perma.cc/4YVU-XG9V]. 
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Nonprofit Hospitals that Trap Them in Debt, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2019), 
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 108. Vincent Navarro, Policy Without Politics: The Limits of Social Engineering, 93 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 64 (2003). 
 109. See Examining the Single-Payer Health Care Option: Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. (2009); High 
Health Care Costs: A State Perspective: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (2008). 
 110. American Public Opinion: Today vs. 30 Years Ago, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2009), 
www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/SunMo_poll_0209.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVB-YAKW] (finding in 
a 2009 public opinion poll that 49% of those surveyed would prefer government-provided health 
insurance over private insurance for “all problems”). 
 111. U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
DATA (2019). 
 112. Press Release, U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016-2025 Projections of 
National Health Expenditure Data Released (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cms.gov /newsroom/press-
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[https://perma.cc/KUU4-K24N]. 
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based healthcare system seems a remote possibility. 
Fairness in financing relates to universal coverage across different sub-
populations in a democracy; it also relates to the way coverage is financed across 
multiple levels of administration in in federalist systems of government. For 
example, since Canada shifted the financing for its healthcare system to the 
equivalent of “block grants” to the provinces, inequities between provinces in 
access to and quality of care have expanded, as well as dissatisfaction among 
populations within provinces.114 In November 2019, the Supreme Court of the 
province of British Columbia heard closing arguments of a years-long case in 
which private medical clinics challenged a provincial law that disallows charging 
patients for necessary medical care.115 If plaintiffs prevail, wealthier patients will 
be able to pay for faster access to essential services, which has the potential to lure 
healthcare professionals into private clinics, worsen wait times in the public system 
and set off a landslide of privatization.116 
It should be noted that this is not the first time that a plaintiff has—
successfully—challenged a prohibition on private health care provision in a 
Canadian province. In Chaoulli v Quebec (AG),117 the Supreme Court of Canada 
struck down Quebec’s law banning private insurance and held that the Quebec 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows for private insurance when the province 
fails to “provide public health care of a reasonable standard within a reasonable 
time”, which was directed at the extensive wait times for certain procedures in 
Quebec’s public healthcare system.118 The Court held that the ban on private 
insurance was not justified by the government’s desire to protect the public 
healthcare system, and listed examples of other countries, such as Germany, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where it claimed that the availability of private 
insurance had not eroded the universal healthcare system.119 
Despite the Chaoulli decision, Quebec’s public healthcare system has thus far 
remained intact without devolving into a two-tiered system, and if we are 
concerned with decision-making about health and the health system as part of 
democracy, it is instructive to understand why. Quebec’s provincial legislature 
produced a moderate response to the ruling, Bill 33, which cabined the impact of 
 
 114. TOBA BRYANT, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH POLICY 151-152 (2009); see also Christel A. 
Woodward & Catharine A. Charles, The Changing Faces of Health Care in Canada, in HEALTH CARE 
REFORM AROUND THE WORLD 78, 81 (Andrew C. Twaddle ed., 2002). 
 115. Kelly Grant, Universal Health Care on Trial: What You Need to Know About a Historic 
Charter Challenge in B.C., GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 12, 2019), 
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 117. Chaoulli v. Quebec (AG) [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.). 
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Chaoulli by allowing private insurance to cover only specified “specialized 
medical treatments” that had the longest wait times in the public system, such as 
hip replacements and cataract surgeries.120 However, the provincial government 
did not allow private insurance for other forms of care available in the public 
system.121 Thus, the court decision triggered a democratic dialogue about the 
relationship between publicly-funded interventions, and the effects on people’s 
dignity and equality under the Quebec Charter, which resulted in a nuanced 
solution that allowed for reasonable realization of various dignity and equality 
interests. In short, organizing a health system around a right to health does not 
dictate a specific modality of administering health care or precise level of health 
financing; however, if we understand health to be part of the texture of democracy, 
financing the health system must reflect equal concern and respect for diverse 
groups and members of society. 
B. Fair and Democratic Priority-Setting 
The criteria for considering that an electoral process or due process of law 
meets constitutional standards in a democracy have been well-established. In 
health systems, these rules and processes must be related to and justified in terms 
of dignity and consent, as described in Part I. They also relate to priority-setting 
processes among competing interests to define entitlements that should be 
available on a basis of non-discrimination. Just as a right to health is not a right to 
be healthy, a right to health cannot mean all treatments for everyone. To be clear, 
as described above, the legitimacy of any given health budget and system financing 
structure must be adequately justified. Decisions regarding a wide array of issues, 
from pharmaceutical regulation to reliance on specialist care as opposed to general 
practitioners, have enormous budgetary consequences, which call for democratic 
scrutiny. However, failure to acknowledge the need for rationing in much human 
rights advocacy is actually anti-democratic and unjust; it is akin to accepting that 
those with power, money, privilege and other sources of status will be the ones 
who get access to health entitlements. As Norman Daniels argues, because health 
needs are potentially bottomless, the question for democratic health systems is 
always, “how can we meet health needs fairly when we cannot meet them all?”122 
That is, there will always be new pathogens, such as COVID-19, as well as new 
treatments and biotechnologies, together with demographic changes that alter 
population health needs and priorities. 
 
 120. See generally An Act to Amend the Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services 
and Other Legislative Provisions, S.Q. 2006, c. 43. 
 121. Yu-Sung Soh, Shooting from the Hip: The Health of Universal Health Care Following 
Chaoulli v. Quebec, THECOURT.CA (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.thecourt.ca/shooting-from-the-hip-
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It is fallacious to act as though progressive achievement of the right to health 
under international law follows some kind of linear path that can be dictated in the 
abstract. Indeed, as Daniels notes, unlike in a trial or an election, where the “rules 
of the game” are widely agreed upon, in health: 
[t]here will be reasonable disagreements about how resources can 
most effectively be used and about what kinds of partial 
improvements—for example, in access to care—should be 
emphasized. Decisions about these issues will create winners and 
losers. Consequently, it is important to establish that all are being 
treated fairly and that the outcome of the negotiation is perceived 
as legitimate.123 
In extending Rawlsian principles of procedural justice as the result of a fair 
and legitimate process, Daniels argues that accountability for reasonableness in 
priority-setting requires four conditions: (1) publicity/transparency (which 
precludes implicit priority-setting based on wait lists and price); (2) decisions made 
upon relevant reasons (as opposed to ideology, rent-seeking, etc.); (3) revisability 
in light of new information; and (4) regulation and enforcement of the first three 
conditions.124 Here it is important to underscore that procedural fairness can 
coexist with protected rights. For example, the denial of a life-saving procedure 
required by women, such as therapeutic abortion, cannot be excluded based upon 
religious or ideological reasons (“comprehensive moral doctrines” in political 
philosophy) even if such denials are accepted by a majority of electors.125 
Consider the most extreme example of rationing ventilators, ICU beds, or 
dialysis machines during the COVID-19 pandemic. As argued above, not 
acknowledging the need for rationing is morally and democratically unacceptable. 
However, the general rule of maximizing the health benefit of a treatment—which 
accepts that all people have equal dignity—must be done in ways that treat diverse 
people with equal concern and respect. A democratic health system cannot permit 
discrimination in information, testing and treatment for COVID-19 on the basis of 
gender, religion, sexual orientation, disability, race, ethnicity, or—importantly—
income or socioeconomic status. Equal concern is also violated if a COVID-19 
patient gets care by displacing others with similarly grave or more serious 
conditions who could benefit more. Moreover, rationing should not be done behind 
closed doors by “experts.” Taking openly about rationing with people who are 
affected, including persons who may have pre-existing conditions or certain 
 
 123. Id. at 319. 
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 125.See generally Seyla Benhabib, The Embattled Public Sphere: Hannah Arendt, Jurgen 
Habermas and Beyond, 44 THEORIA 1 (1997). 
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disabilities, may produce important revisions of policy based on these 
considerations, such as giving extra priority to the worst off.126 Indeed, in 
Massachusetts there was backlash when the public (including disproportionately 
affected minority populations and persons with disabilities) was not consulted,. 
Revised crisis guidelines were then issued, which at least ensured that priority for 
critical equipment would only take into account immediate survival probabilities, 
and not long-term quality or disability-adjusted life measures that could lead to 
invidious discrimination against persons with certain disabilities.127 
In crisis situations and “normal” times alike, if we take seriously the 
connections between health and democracy, the criteria by which health 
entitlements are defined and ranked cannot be decided exclusively by technocrats 
behind closed doors.128 Of course, health professionals (epidemiologists, clinicians 
and health economists, among others) play a critical role in compiling evidence 
regarding clinical- and cost-effectiveness; appraising the strength of that evidence; 
and ensuring health benefit packages are “data driven and evidence-based.”129 
Governments are ultimately responsible for ensuring the legitimacy of the 
decisions and process. Nonetheless, it is increasingly acknowledged that values 
and norms are inescapably embedded in every level and aspect of health systems, 
just as they are in other fundamental social institutions—such as education and 
justice systems. In a democracy, it would be unacceptable for curricula to be 
defined or trial outcomes decided without transparency and public input in one 
way or another. For priority-setting processes to be democratically legitimate as 
well as scientifically sound, meaningful consultation with those who will have to 
live by the priorities that are set is essential, as demonstrated even in the most 
extreme example of crisis triage guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Indeed, the WHO’s multi-disciplinary Technical Advisory Group on 
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Principles of Health Benefit Package Design argues that “[a] sound principle is 
that all affected parties, all stakeholders and their interests, should be represented 
in the process and able to make their voices heard on conditions of rough 
background equality.”130 This opportunity for broad and equitable stakeholder 
input does not only apply to the design and selection of package benefits 
themselves, but also to the necessarily preceding discussion of what norms and 
values will shape the criteria that guide the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
benefits. Indeed, the Advisory Group expressly identifies that “social values play 
an important role in the selection of benefits” and a “legitimate, fair decision-
making process will begin with a transparent and inclusive identification of the 
criteria in the local setting, with all appropriate stakeholders included in the criteria 
selection process.”131 
Concrete examples of processes that increase participatory decision-making 
include exercises in deliberative polling, which Jane Mansbridge argues has 
knock-on benefits to democratic engagement in electoral and consultative 
processes.132 Further, the National Health Service in Britain makes use of a non-
statutory Priorities Committee that “includes NHS clinicians and managers as well 
as a lay chair, legal advisor, and [lay] ethical advisor, and reviews treatments that 
local stakeholders submit for consideration.”133 Health systems can also draw 
inspiration from structured citizen participation on public issues that are similarly 
complex. For example, in Toronto, Canada two panels comprised of randomly 
selected citizens meet every two months over a two-year period to “provide 
informed inputs on planning or transportation issues.”134 Finally, democratic 
engagement with priority-setting in health should not be limited to “official” 
channels. As the society-wide debates on the issue of abortion in Argentina and 
Ireland have made clear, social movements play an important role in creating 
spaces in which social values can be clarified and health policies can be shaped.135 
This activism can have profound results, as in Ireland’s successful referendum to 
 
 130. Id. at 4. See also ALL. FOR HEALTH POLICY & SYS. RESEARCH, STRENGTHENING HEALTH 
SYSTEMS: THE ROLE AND PROMISE OF POLICY AND HEALTH SYSTEMS RESEARCH (2004); Jalil Safaei, 
Deliberative Democracy in Health Care: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, 7 J. 
HEALTHCARE LEADERSHIP 123 (2015). 
 131. PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH BENEFIT PACKAGE DESIGN, supra note 129, at 4. 
 132. Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Polling as the Gold Standard, 19 GOOD SOC’Y 55 (2010). 
 133. MISFORTUNE, supra note 20 (quoting Christopher Newdick, Can Judges Ration with 
Compassion?—A Priority Setting Matrix, 20 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J., June 2018, at 107, 111). 
 134. See Claudia Chwalisz, A New Wave of Deliberative Democracy, CARNEGIE EUROPE (Nov. 
26, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/10-17-19_Chwalisz_Deliberative.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8ASU-Y9GW]. 
 135. See Argentina Abortion: Crowds Gather to Back Pro-Choice Bill, BBC (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-48444884 [https://perma.cc/8Y52-RRUA]; 
Timeline: Ireland and Abortion, BBC (May 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
43962738 [https://perma.cc/CM8P-RNS4]. 
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repeal the Constitutional subsection prohibiting most abortions and replacing it 
with a provision that allowed the legislature to start regulating legal abortion.136 
Some courts have acknowledged the importance of user participation in a 
constitutionally legitimate process for designing health benefit packages. 
Responding to systematic regulatory failure in the health system in the famous T-
760/08 decision, the Colombian Constitutional Court ordered the government to 
comply with its legislated responsibility to conduct a yearly “systematic review” 
of the obligatory health benefits scheme “with regard to: (1) changes in 
demographic structure, (2) the national epidemiological profile, (3) appropriate 
technology available in the country, and (4) the financial conditions of the 
system.”137 The Court held the government accountable by setting standards and 
deadlines for compliance, but left most decisions about priority-setting and 
resource allocation to the government—albeit with mandated meaningful 
opportunities for public participation by the scientific community and affected 
groups.138 
As discussed further in Section II.E. below, this “dialogical approach” to 
judicial oversight is consistent with democratic experimentalism, understanding 
the limits of the Court’s democratic legitimacy in dictating the content of a right 
to health. As Mark Tushnet has described, “[a] democratic experimentalist court 
begins with a constitutional principle stated at a reasonably high level of 
abstraction” and “offer[s] an incomplete specification of the principle’s meaning 
in a particular context” before asking “legislators and executive officials to develop 
and begin to implement plans that have a reasonable prospect of fulfilling the 
incompletely specified constitutional requirement.”139 Once legislative and 
executive actors have acted, or at least attempted, to meet constitutional demands, 
courts engage with the results of that experiment and assess whether the 
constitutional minimum has been met, and if not, what else is required.140 This 
iterative process, a form of weak judicial review, “places into question the 
assumption that judicial review must involve coercive orders” and can be used 
 
 136. See Ivana Bacik, Ireland Has Changed Utterly: the Cruel Eighth Amendment is History, 
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/26 /ireland-has-
changed-utterly-the-cruel-eighth-amendment-is-history [https://perma.cc/S4KL-PBL8]; History of 
Abortion in Ireland, IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASS’N, https://www.ifpa.ie/advocacy/abortion-in-
ireland-legal-timeline [https://perma.cc/2WTU-6SR3]. 
 137. English Summary, Judgment T-760/08, ESCR-NET, https://www.escr-
net.org/sites/default/files/English_summary_T-760.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AN8-BF5Q] (quoting 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08 § 6.1.1.1.1, 
https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/t-760-08.htm [https://perma.cc/5WR4-
NLMD] [hereinafter T-760/08]). 
 138. Id. (quoting T-760/08, §§ 3.3.9, 4.1.3, 4.4.2, 6.1.3, 6.1.2.2). 
 139. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights – And 
Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 822-23 (2003). 
 140. Id. 
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effectively to enforce social and economic rights through courts in a way that is 
still democratically legitimate.141 Indeed, in practice, the T-760/08 decision 
fostered a process of structured participation in decision-making in relation to 
Colombia’s health system, which was crucial to a reawakened political debate and 
the country’s adoption of a Statutory Framework Law on Health based explicitly 
on the right to health in 2015.142 As discussed below, this form of judicial oversight 
offers particular promise in the realm of health, where the rules set out by any 
decision have multifaceted impacts on different stakeholders. 
C. Health Service Organization and Delivery 
Just as with the organization of electoral and judicial systems, the organization 
and delivery of services is equally important to the democratic function of a health 
system. Indeed, they function in synergy. Consider again the example of rationing 
ventilators, ICU beds, or dialysis machines during the global COVID-19 
pandemic.143 Rationing of patients’ access to intensive care at the micro-level is 
deeply affected by prior decisions and policies regarding health system capacity 
and function, including allocations of scarce health resources among sub-national 
areas. 
Further, containing transmission rates is inextricably related to testing, contact 
tracing, and isolation, which depends upon public health and systems that have 
invested in primary care capacities. Likewise, systems that invest in strengthening 
primary care capacities are critical for ensuring availability and accessibility of a 
wide swath of interventions in “normal” times, which cannot be met by systems 
that focus on specialty and tertiary care. 
Under the formulation of the right to health set out by CESCR, the 
organization of a health system must ensure that health care services are not only 
available and accessible, but also acceptable and of adequate quality.144 The 
organization of a health system affects all of these inter-related elements. For 
example, accessibility has been interpreted as having several dimensions, 
including non-discrimination, affordability, accessibility of information 
concerning health issues, and physical accessibility.145 Physical accessibility can 
be further broken down into safe geographic accessibility, especially for 
 
 141. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 228, 249 (2008). 
 142. Id. at 16. See also L. 1751, febrero 16, 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); OFFICE OF 
THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE FOR THE JUDICIARY ON APPLYING A HUMAN 
RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO HEALTH 11-12 (2010). 
 143. See James Hamblin, The Curve is not Flat Enough, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-forcing-american-hospitals-ration-
care/609004 [https://perma.cc/QFV7-WW2R]. 
 144. General Comment No. 14, supra note 6, ¶ 12. 
 145. Id. ¶ 12(b). 
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marginalized populations, as well as physical accessibility of buildings for 
disabled persons.146 One local initiative that has worked to foster accessibility in 
health care is the establishment of Mohalla Clinics in Delhi, which were an integral 
part of the Aam Aadmi Party’s vision for local democracy. In response to 
constituents’ public demands, they designed the Mohalla Clinics to increase 
underserved urban populations’ access to basic health services, without having to 
travel long distances or pay fees.147 The results have been stunning: on average, 
these clinics increased their patients’ average number of healthcare visits per year 
to 5.6; the average across India is just 1 per year.148 
In addition to accounting for the rights of diverse patients, the organization of 
a democratic healthcare system should account for the rights of workers as well. 
Workers are not cogs in a technical apparatus designed to achieve specific 
outcomes. Rather, in the same way that due process and equal justice suffer when 
overworked public defenders cannot provide quality representation to indigent 
defendants,149 the healthcare system functions less democratically—and less 
effectively—when healthcare workers are set up to fail by long hours, low pay, a 
lack of adequate facilities, and other poor working conditions.150 We have 
witnessed this acutely during the COVID-19 crisis, as overworked health workers 
have faced inadequate safety protections in a number of countries. 
In some instances, “human rights-based approaches” to health have not paid 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Chandrakant Lahariya, Mohalla Clinics of Delhi, India: Could These Become Platform to 
Strengthen Primary Healthcare? 6 J. FAMILY MED. & PRIMARY CARE 1 (2017); Subir Roy, Mohalla 
Clinics, A Viable Primary-Care Model, HINDU BUSINESSLINE (Nov. 28, 2019), 
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/mohalla-clinics-a-viable-primary-care-
model/article30099666.ece [https://perma.cc/YL9J-UY9E]; Sadhika Tiwari, How the Aam Aadmi 
Party’s Mohalla Clinics Changed Public Healthcare in Delhi, SCROLL.IN (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://scroll.in/article/952440/how-the-aam-aadmi-partys-mohalla-clinics-changed-public-
healthcare-in-delhi [https://perma.cc/439B-2HFZ]. 
 148. Tiwari, supra note 147. 
 149. See, e.g., Matt Ford, A ‘Constitutional Crisis’ in Missouri, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/missouri-public-defender-crisis/519444 
[https://perma.cc/4SCF-FJ4P]; Oliver Laughland, The Human Toll of America’s Public Defender 
Crisis, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/07/public-
defender-us-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/59MH-L7NB]; Pamela Melzger, Equal 
Justice Depends on Properly Funding Public Defenders, HILL (May 22, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/444588-equal-justice-depends-on-properly-funding-
public-defenders [https://perma.cc/DJT3-2P7R]. 
 150. See, e.g., Ryan Cronk & Jamie Bartram, Environmental Conditions in Health Care 
Facilities in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Coverage and Inequities, 221 INTL. J. HYGIENE & 
ENVTL. HEALTH 409 (2018); Jack Needleman et al. Nurse-Staffing Levels and the Quality of Care in 
Hospitals, 22 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1715 (2002); Roni Jacobson, Widespread Understaffing of Nurses 




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss2/3
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 19:2 (2020) 
128 
sufficient attention to the rights of health workers, or to systemic issues. For 
example, maternal death reviews—which have been touted as a “human rights-
based approach” to accountability for maternal deaths151—more likely than not 
scapegoat health workers with little control over the circumstances of a woman’s 
death, while systemic issues, such as supply chain problems, are left unaddressed. 
Punitive treatment of health workers invariably affects the treatment of patients as 
well. Indeed, it is simply impossible to create and sustain democratic health 
systems without recognizing health workers’ rights to safe and respectful work 
environments and adequate compensation. In a positive development, in December 
2019, Uruguay became the first country in the world to ratify ILO Convention 190 
on Violence and Harassment,152 which recognizes that in addition to impacting 
women’s health in myriad ways, sexual harassment also “affects the quality of 
public and private services.”153 A potential effect of the current pandemic could be 
to raise much needed consciousness of how the health rights of patients are inter-
dependent on the rights of healthcare providers and other nonclinical workers in 
healthcare settings. 
D. Information to be Active Citizens Regarding Health 
Conceiving of health in terms of rights, and health systems as democratic 
institutions, immediately makes apparent that people are not just passive patients 
or targets of health policies and programming; they should be treated as informed 
and active participants in both personal and policy decisions with respect to health 
and their health systems. As noted in Section II.C., the availability and accessibility 
of information is listed as an inter-related element of the right to health in CESCR 
General Comment 14, including “the right to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas concerning health issues.”154 In Article 14(2)(b), CEDAW mandates that 
states must ensure that even women in rural areas “have access to adequate health 
 
 151. Paul Hunt, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Paul Hunt, Addendum 2: Mission to India, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/20/Add.2 ¶¶ 71-74 (Apr. 15, 2010); Office of the UN High Comm’r for Human Rights, 
Technical Guidance on the Application of a Human Rights-Based Approach to the Implementation 
of Policies and Programmes to Reduce Preventable Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/21/22 ¶ 75(c) (July 2, 2012). 
 152. Uruguay is the First Country in the World to Ratify ILO Convention 190, PUB. SERV. INT’L 
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://publicservices.international/resources/news/uruguay-is-the-first-country-in-
the-world-to-ratify-ilo-convention-190?id=10498&lang=en [https://perma.cc/9UV9-5DSP]. 
Following the second ratification by Fiji on June 25, 2020, the convention will enter into force in 
2021. ILO Violence and Harassment Convention Will Enter into Force in June 2021, INT’L LABOR 
ORG. (June 25, 2020), https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_749148/lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Y4PP-QLUT]. 
 153. Convention Concerning the Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of 
Work, adopted by the International Labor Organization June 21, 2019, 58 I.L.M. 1170 pmbl. 
 154. General Comment No. 14, supra note 6, ¶ 12(b). 
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care facilities, including information, counselling and services in family 
planning.”155 Elaborating on this duty to ensure that health information is 
accessible, in General Recommendation 34 on the Rights of Rural Women, the 
CEDAW Committee specifies that states parties should ensure: 
[t]hat health-care information is widely disseminated in local 
languages and dialects through various media, including in 
writing, through illustrations and orally, and that it includes 
information on, inter alia: hygiene; preventing communicable, 
non-communicable and sexually transmitted diseases; healthy 
lifestyles and nutrition; family planning and the benefits of 
delayed childbearing; health during pregnancy; breastfeeding and 
its impact on child and maternal health; and the need to eliminate 
violence against women, including sexual and domestic violence 
and harmful practices.156 
Ensuring the right to health requires broad accessibility and availability of 
information, in terms of both form and content. 
Courts have consistently played a role in ensuring protection against 
insufficient and misleading information about health. For example, the European 
Court of Human Rights has recognized the importance of having sufficiently 
clear—medical and legal—information to effectively challenge a healthcare 
decision. In Tysiac v. Poland, Ms. Tysiac was denied a legal abortion by her doctor, 
despite evidence that pregnancy could cause irreparable damage to her vision.157 
The Court found that Poland had violated Ms. Tysiac’s right to privacy under 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by providing no clear legal 
mechanism by which she could challenge her doctor’s denial of a medically 
necessary abortion, and no requirement for doctors to provide accessible, 
documented reasons upon which the challenge could be based.158 The Court 
emphasized that a proper framework needs to “ensure clarity of the pregnant 
woman’s legal position” with regard to the abortion she is seeking.159 In a later 
case, the European Committee on Social Rights recognized that the requirement of 
accessible and accurate information does not only apply in the context of 
individual health decisions, but also more broadly, in its holding that sexual health 
education including discriminatory and incorrect information about LGBTQI 
 
 155. CEDAW, supra note 39. 
 156. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 34 (2016) on the Rights of Rural Women ¶ 39(f), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/34 (2016). 
 157. See generally Tysiac v. Poland, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 219. 
 158. Id. ¶¶ 114-135. 
 159. Id. ¶ 116. 
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sexual health violates the right to health under the European Social Charter.160 If 
health and health systems are democratic social institutions, the right to 
information must then be understood not in a narrow instrumental way but broadly, 
as fundamental to the legitimate authority of a democratic government. 
For health to be treated as a matter of democracy, people need to be enabled 
to participate meaningfully not just in decisions that affect their own health, and in 
priority-setting, as discussed above. In a pandemic and in normal times, diversely 
situated people also need to be able to see how government policies are rationally 
related to, and justifiable in terms of, protecting public health. Such policies also 
include the regulation of private actors. For example, a United States Court of 
Appeals decision found that Philip Morris USA, a cigarette manufacturer, engaged 
for decades “in a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers” by denying 
various adverse health effects of smoking and second-hand smoke.161 While this 
case was not framed in terms of the right to health, many of the remedies were 
fashioned to provide consumers with health information they should have had all 
along, including providing corrective statements, disclosing marketing data, and 
publishing all previously withheld health research on the company website.162 
Similarly, the use of algorithms to govern our lives has been increasingly 
questioned as highly undemocratic.163 Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
potential effects on population health, where algorithms are now deployed to make 
distributive decisions within domestic welfare systems and public health 
interventions. If the value of democracy lies in establishing a “republic of 
reasons,”164 it requires more than the black box assessments that algorithms offer. 
Rather, it requires some mechanism for providing those affected by algorithm-
informed choices with a meaningful opportunity to shape the normative framing 
of the issue, values, and assumptions that are inherently built into the algorithm. 
For example, in terms of framing, Philip Alston has written about how the 
digitization of welfare, while presented as a benign and efficient update to existing 
systems, broadly facilitates “a move towards a detached bureaucratic process” that 
puts the onus on the citizen to meet technical eligibility requirements.165 This 
 
 160. Interights v Croatia, Complaint No. 45/2007, ¶¶ 60–61 (Eur. Comm. Soc. Rights Apr. 9, 
2009), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=cc-45-2007-dmerits-en [https://perma.cc/2BNL-Q3KZ]. 
 161. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d on 
this issue, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Ben Green, The Responsible City: Avoiding Technology’s Undemocratic Social 
Contracts, in THE SMART ENOUGH CITY (2019), available at 
https://smartenoughcity.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/yvyv9j2i/release/1; Henry A. Giroux, Totalitarian 
Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, 29 CULTURAL STUD. 108 (2015); David Lyon, 
State and Surveillance, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/state-and-surveillance [https://perma.cc/FZF8-ZZ7W]. 
 164. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 239 (2001). 
 165. Philip Alston, What the “Digital Welfare State” Really Means for Human Rights, OPEN 
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conceptualization of individuals as “applicants” rather than “rights-holders” flips 
the presumption that undergirds the exercise of human rights, as “[i]nstead of the 
State being accountable to the citizen for ensuring an adequate standard of living 
for all, the burden of accountability is now on the citizen to demonstrate that he or 
she is somehow deserving.”166 
Moreover, algorithmic assessments of who is deserving of assistance can 
reinforce existing biases and power imbalances. Algorithms may not inherently be 
biased, but often the end up that way due to the unexamined assumptions of the 
people and organizations that design and implement them. The exploding use of 
algorithms in health is particularly dangerous because it invisibly institutionalizes 
these biases and cloaks them in a veneer of scientific legitimacy. One well-
publicized example involved a widely used risk-prediction tool in the United 
States,167 which was used to identify at-risk patients who need additional 
healthcare intervention.168 The tool used cost of care as a proxy for the patient’s 
need, despite the fact that “unequal access to care means that we spend less money 
caring for Black patients than for White patients.”169 The result of this imbalance 
was that the algorithm failed to identify nearly 30% of cases where extra 
intervention was warranted for Black patients—therefore not only failing these 
individual patients, but reinforcing a cycle in which Black patients systemically 
receive less care.170 In short, a democratic health system’s determination regarding 
the contours of health entitlements should not only be able to justify the decisions, 
but also the reasons for those decisions. 
E. Oversight: Regulation and Remedies 
As suggested throughout this Article, if we understand health systems to 
embed normative values, then in order to meet democratic standards, health system 
standards and procedures require not just technical oversight but also regulatory 
and judicial oversight, to ensure they are consistent with normative commitments 
set out in legal frameworks. In all of the cases mentioned above, whether financing 
a sexual reassignment surgery or allowing private providers to offer certain non-
essential health services, courts can play important roles in subjecting decisions in 
 
GLOB. RIGHTS (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.openglobalrights.org/digital-welfare-state-and-what-it-
means-for-human-rights [https://perma.cc/NH87-CCGE]. 
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 167. This tool was applied to approximately 200 million patients annually. See Ziad Obermeyer, 
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Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447, 448 (2019). 
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 170. See id.; see also Milena A. Gianfrancesco, Suzanne Tamang, Jinoos Yazdany & Gabriela 
Schmajuk, Potential Biases in Machine Learning Algorithms Using Electronic Health Record Data, 
178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1544 (2018). 
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health to scrutiny in line with constitutional or international human rights 
commitments. 
In addition to protecting democratically justified decisions, courts can spur 
public learning regarding constitutional and human rights commitments by taking 
normative arguments seriously and making visible concerns of often marginalized 
groups.171 According to Keith Syrett, courts’ decisions have the ability to 
strengthen the public legitimacy of necessary rationing in the health system:172 
The provision of reasons for decisions therefore enables judges to 
offer an explanation to (and thus to educate) both the losing side 
and the wider public in terms which meet the conditions of 
reciprocity: that is, those which “fair-minded people” seeking 
social co-operation can recognise as valid and germane in the light 
of principles and ideals which they endorse as rational, even if 
they may disagree on the conclusion reached in the instant case. 
In this manner, the practice of judicial reason-giving may 
contribute to legitimacy either through acceptance of the validity 
of the reasons offered or, more indirectly, through its impact as a 
stimulus for a further process of public deliberation which can 
provide the conditions through which such legitimacy may be 
secured.173 
Thus, court intervention into health systems need not be seen as a threat to 
those systems—rather, courts can play an “instrumental” or “facilitative” role, by 
“channeling and guiding decision-making processes” and “diagnosing and 
addressing institutional and/or systemic problems and weaknesses.”174 For 
example, as in the case in Kenya discussed above in which women were detained 
postpartum at the hospital because they could not pay their medical bills, a court 
holding that their human rights were violated provides a signal to the legislature 
that healthcare cannot be left entirely to market forces. Rather, it must be organized 
in a more principled way to meet human rights requirements. Indeed, as the right 
to health is inherently complex—due both to the “spiderweb-like effects” of health 
decisions, as Lon Fuller described,175 and to the uncertainty regarding what the 
 
 171. Roberto Gargarella, Dialogic Justice in the Enforcement of Social Rights: Some Initial 
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 174. Id. at 127, 135, 157. 
 175. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395 
(1978). 
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right to health entails—this facilitative role is essential. 
Further, if we are concerned with strengthening links between democracy and 
health, even individual protection writ remedies (e.g., amparos and tutelas in Latin 
America) should seek to catalyze and reinforce legitimate priority-setting and 
regulation, rather than substitute judicial judgment in ad hoc ways. In such mixed 
common and civil law jurisdictions, the accumulation of protection writ cases 
regarding clusters of complaints allows courts to address regulatory and 
compliance gaps, and to ensure the priority-setting processes conform to 
democratic principles. 
Likewise, in structural matters, courts can supplement rather than supplant 
political discussion regarding health by “set[ting] the boundaries of a political 
decision, or provid[ing] politicians with criteria about basic constitutional 
demands—criteria to be taken into account by the legislators in their decisions.”176 
As Robin West has written, “[t]he pinnacle moment of ordinary legalism is not the 
trial . . . it is the legislative process” through which a shared commitment to certain 
legal ends is made.177 Courts can thus also intervene to address structural problems 
that legislators systematically fail to address, such as environmental issues and the 
health rights of marginalized minorities.178 Indeed, this is what occurred in the 
Mexican Supreme Court’s abortion decision—after holding that the denial of 
abortion services discriminatorily deprived only women of an essential health 
service, the court instructed Mexican sub-national states to take up an issue that 
had previously been ignored, and to design and implement “policies aimed at 
providing women with access to a full range of high-quality and affordable health 
care, including sexual and reproductive healthcare services.”179 
Courts can also play this democratically legitimate role with public health 
conditions beyond care, which tend to be equally polycentric and spiderweb-like. 
For example, in Beatriz Silvia Mendoza y Otros c. Estado Nacional y Otros, the 
Argentine Supreme Court addressed extreme the environmental pollution of the 
Matanza/Riachuelo River and the ensuing health impacts, and presided over a 
resulting mega “Clean-Up Plan” undertaken by the government defendants.180 The 
Court set forth three goals: (1) improving the river basin inhabitants’ quality of 
life; (2) restoring the environment; and (3) preventing reasonably foreseeable 
harm, including to health. In its follow-up, the Court established highly complex 
reporting and compliance requirements on a variety of issues, including public 
 
 176. Gargarella, supra note 171, at 239. 
 177. Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 154 (2003). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Amparo en Revisión 1388/2015, supra note 43, ¶ 104 (¶ 59 in the translation). 
 180. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
8/7/2008, “Beatriz Silvia Mendoza y Otros c. Estado Nacional y Otros / daños y perjuicios,” Fallos 
de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Fallos] (2008-331-1622). 
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information, industrial pollution, landfill clean-up, sanitation, and emergency 
health plans. In the process, the Court engaged technical experts and emphasized 
the importance of strengthening citizen participation in the monitoring, but like 
that in T-760/08, it left the exact methods for compliance to the government’s 
discretion. Notwithstanding the unwieldy challenge of overseeing government 
compliance, ten years later there were notable, if slow, improvements, including 
the removal of 1,500 tons of solid waste from the river, the construction of 14 
health centers, the development of sewage plans, and relocation of 122 families 
out of high-risk zones near the river.181 It also led to the establishment of a new 
oversight mechanism, ACUMAR, and to sustained citizen engagement in a 
structured participation process for making decisions that affect residents’ lives 
and well-being.182 The Mendoza case, as others, demonstrates that courts can play 
a catalytic role in spurring democratic action regarding health issues, rather than 
instituting top-down solutions: “if the law is to bind [the people] as free men and 
women, they must also be its makers.”183 
Needless to say, in health, just as in other fields, complex structural remedies 
do not catalyze democratic deliberation automatically—they call for participatory 
follow-up, together with significant independent authority and a robust mandate 
for the court. A 2001 case from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights reveals the outcome when ongoing oversight processes are absent. The case 
alleged severe environmental degradation and resulting health harms in the 
Ogoniland area of Nigeria from the activities of oil corporations.184 The 
Commission called on Nigeria to provide “meaningful access to regulatory and 
decision-making bodies [for] communities likely to be affected by oil operations” 
but had no ability to meaningfully monitor state implementation of and compliance 
with the decision.185 As a result of the lack of a compliance structure, as well as 
 
 181. Fabiana Frayssinet, It Takes More than Two to Tango — or to Clean up Argentina’s 
Riachuelo River, IPS NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/08/it-takes-more-than-
two-to-tango-or-to-clean-up-argentinas-riachuelo-river [https://perma.cc/5QPH-QNZH]. 
 182. Mendoza Beatriz Silva et al. vs. State of Argentina et al. on damages (damages resulting 
from environmental pollution of Matanza/Riachuelo river). File M. 1569. XL, ESCR-NET (Jan. 2, 
2019), https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2011/mendoza-beatriz-silva-et-al-vs-state-argentina-et-al-
damages-damages-resulting [https://perma.cc/T9WH-HBMT]. 
 183. Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy 9 POL. THEORY 379, 383 (1981). 
 184. Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Commc’n No. 155/96 (Afr. Comm’n on 
Human & Peoples’ Rights Oct. 27, 2001), https://www.achpr.org/sessions/descions?id=134 
[https://perma.cc/9FWK-BM65]. 
 185. Id. Estimates by the Centre for Human Rights in Pretoria suggest that “in 2004-2005 
approximately 34-35% of the ACHPR’s recommendations had been implemented” and that the 
Commission’s limited follow-up procedures stem from a lack of funding. Follow-Up and 
Implementation of Decisions by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION 
CTR., UNIV. OF BRISTOL LAW SCH. 6-7 (2009), http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-
library/sites/law/migrated/documents/semrep2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/4466-G45N] [hereinafter 
Follow-Up and Implementation]. 
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the refusal of corporate giant Shell to take any action in relation to its oil-producing 
activities in Ogoniland, severe environmental and health degradation in the area 
has continued.186 Importantly, this lack of an effective compliance structure is not 
a problem unique to the African human rights system—it is present to some degree 
in all regional human rights systems, as well as UN treaty-monitoring bodies,187 
suggesting challenges for trying to use supranational bodies to catalyze systemic 
change. 
In short, in this section we have posited that if addressing disagreements 
among a diverse population is the principal challenge of the democratic state, there 
is no area in which such disagreements have more immediate—indeed, often life-
and-death—consequences than in health, and these disagreements are played out 
in health systems, as well as in the policies that affect health. Understanding the 
right to health as connected to the negotiation of competing claims and interests 
through democratically legitimate processes significantly shifts the focus of 
progressive achievement of the right to health. Progressive realization must entail 
institutionalizing processes that provide choice situations that both continually 
evolve in light of changing demographics, technologies, and epidemiology, and 
also reinforce norms of equality and solidarity. Here we have argued that taking 
seriously the connection between rights claims and the role of health systems as 
democratic social institutions has implications for how laws structure health 
 
 186. Shell and Nigeria Have Failed on Oil Pollution Clean-Up, Amnesty Says, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
4, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/aug/04/shell-nigeria-oil-pollution-clean-
up-amnesty [https://perma.cc/2BF3-6WLA]. 
 187. In the Inter-American system, “between 2001 and 2006, the [Inter-American] Commission 
reported full compliance with its decisions in only 5.3% of cases” while the Inter-American Court 
reported full compliance in only “11.57% of judgments.” Follow-Up and Implementation, supra note 
185, at 9. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has a “long-standing, formal and well-
documented” follow-up procedure which involves the “Committee of Ministers,” a body which meets 
four times per year for the sole purpose of documenting state action taken to comply with judgments. 
The Committee keeps state judgments on its docket and continues to seek state redress until full 
compliance is achieved, and publishes its findings after each meeting. However, despite this 
relatively effective follow-up procedure for individual cases, the existence of “repetitive cases” being 
brought against certain member states indicates that the European Court’s follow-up procedures are 
not necessarily resolving systemic problems within the offending states. Id. at 11–12. 
Some treaty-monitoring and supranational bodies also have follow-up procedures to guide state 
implementation of human rights decisions, but like the regional procedures, tend to be unable to 
enforce full compliance. The UN Human Rights Committee that oversees compliance with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) uses a “grading” system to determine 
how well a defendant state has implemented the Committee’s “Communications” (decisions) on 
individual complaints brought under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. The committees 
charged with enforcing other UN treaties, including CRPD, CEDAW, ICESCR, and the Convention 
Against Torture, use similar, yet not identical grading systems. However, not only do the committees 
lack any actual enforcement power, but the actual grades given to states being monitored are not 
sufficiently disseminated to human rights advocates and communities. See Vincent Ploton, The 
Implementation of UN Treaty Body Recommendations, 14 SUR: INT’L J. HUM. RTS., Jul. 2017, at 219. 
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system financing, priority-setting processes, and health service organization and 
delivery, and guarantee information regarding health. It also makes apparent the 
need for judicial oversight to catalyze and reinforce democratic commitments to 
equal moral consideration in health systems. 
III. HEALTH AND DEMOCRACY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 
It might seem counterintuitive to argue that health is a matter of democracy 
and at the same time suggest that obligations go beyond borders and transcend the 
state-citizen dyad. Yet perhaps the most obvious lesson of the COVID-19 
pandemic is that diseases do not respect borders, and states’ obligations to protect 
the security of their inhabitants must adjust to that fact. Likewise, diseases do not 
respect taxonomies of access to entitlements based upon legal citizenship. And 
beyond the current pandemic, treating the right to health as fundamental to liberal 
democracies calls for rewriting the narrative of who is entitled to assets of 
democratic inclusion and reconsidering the nature of shared national-global health 
governance. As Jennifer Prah Ruger has argued, such a model of shared health 
governance “differs from the technocratic model in understanding that political 
legitimacy involves normative reasoning and public deliberation.”188 Shared health 
governance is “based on a genuine commitment among global health actors to 
achieve health justice as opposed to pursuing narrow self, group, or state interest 
alone,”189 through the sharing of resources, accountability, and most importantly, 
power.190 Here we consider how in a global context of massive migration and 
forced displacement,191 democracies must account for more liminal forms of 
citizenship in access to health entitlements and consider the claims of people 
beyond borders whose health is affected by the actions of a state or by actors under 
the state’s effective control.192 
A. Migrants 
Patricia Illingworth and Wendy E. Parmet have argued that neither of the two 
theories of citizenship typically offered by legal scholarship “provides an adequate 
justification for the denial of health-related rights” to migrants.193 First, they argue 
 
 188. JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE 366 (2018). 
 189. Id. at 145. 
 190. Id. at 167–70. 
 191. Adrian Edwards, Forced Displacement at Record 68.5 Million, UNHCR: UN REFUGEE 
AGENCY (June 19, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/6/5b222c494/forced-
displacement-record-685-million.html [https://perma.cc/F8XP-G8B6]. 
 192. ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Sep. 28, 2011) [hereinafter 
MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES]. 
 193. PATRICIA ILLINGWORTH & WENDY E. PARMET, THE HEALTH OF NEWCOMERS 170–71 
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that the ascriptive, or legal, theory of citizenship—as “something that attaches to 
people as a result of an innate status, such as birth in a territory or membership in 
a distinct demographic group”—is tautology, providing no justification for why 
any particular status that endows citizenship should also automatically determine 
health rights.194 The second theory of citizenship, the consent view, is more 
logically and morally defensible, but still inconsistent with the denial of health 
rights to non-legal citizens, because social citizens do “demonstrate their consent 
to membership in the nations to which they have immigrated” in many different 
ways.195 These include working (often in “necessary jobs, such as caretaking for 
the ill, that citizens abjure”); paying taxes; and engaging in volunteer work or 
political activism.196 Starkly divergent choices with respect to immigrants’ 
inclusion in U.S. democracy, as Tiffany Joseph has identified, are illustrated by 
the express exclusion of many non-legal citizens from the Federal Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) versus their inclusion in 
Massachusetts’ 2006 health care reforms (which ironically served as a model for 
the ACA).197 The Massachusetts healthcare system has a larger immigrant 
population than the national average, yet recognizes a broader category of 
immigrants that have consented to be part of its “civic community” than the 
ACA.198 
Importantly, immigrants’ rights to health can also be indirectly violated even 
if health care is available but practical barriers inhibit access to services. In 
Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium,199 the European Committee 
of Social Rights—charged with interpreting and monitoring compliance with the 
European Charter of Social Rights—addressed the failure of Belgium to enforce 
its laws providing for the reception of unaccompanied foreign minors into 
observation and guidance centres where they could theoretically receive support 
and material assistance. The committee noted “the total lack—since 2009—of 
reception facilities for accompanied foreign minors and the partial lack of such 
facilities for unaccompanied foreign minors, leading some of them to live in the 
street, makes it difficult for foreign minors unlawfully in the country to access the 
health system.”200 The committee connected the state’s failure to ensure that 
 
(2017). 
 194. Id. at 170–71. 
 195. Id. at 173. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Tiffany D. Joseph, What Health Care Reform Means for Immigrants: Comparing the 
Affordable Care Act and Massachusetts Health Reforms, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 101 (2016). 
 198. Id. at 104, 111. 
 199. Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, Complaint No. 69/2011 (Eur. Comm. 
Soc. Rights Oct. 23, 2012), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng?i=cc-69-2011-dmerits-en [https:// 
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 200. Id. ¶ 116. 
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migrant children were not living on the street, with poor access to health care. 
Thus, the committee found a violation of the right of access to health care under 
Article 11, Section 1 of the European Social Charter, first finding that failing to 
apply Article 11, Section 1 to unlawfully present minors “would mean not securing 
their right to the preservation of human dignity and exposing the children and 
young persons concerned to serious threats to their lives and physical integrity.”201 
In turn, the committee held that “providing foreign minors with housing and foster 
homes is a minimum prerequisite for attempting to remove the causes of ill health 
among these minors (including epidemic, endemic or other diseases)” and that 
Belgium had failed to meet this obligation.202 
B. Transnational Drivers of Health, and Extraterritorial Obligations (ETOs) 
It is not just infectious diseases that cross borders and cause ill-health. In 
today’s world many determinants of health and structures of health systems lie in 
transnational space. The Lancet–University of Oslo Commission on Global Health 
Governance dubbed the “norms, policies, and practices that arise from 
transnational interaction” the “political determinants of health,” which “cause and 
maintain health inequities.”203 Transnational obligations relating to health do not 
relate only to the health of migrants, but can apply extraterritorially as well.204 
Under international human rights law, there are obligations of “assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical” to facilitate national states 
progressively realizing the right to health, as well as all other economic and social 
rights.205 
A number of scholars have emphasized the importance of the financial aspect 
of these obligations. Perhaps most notably, Gorik Ooms and Rachel Hammonds 
have argued in a number of papers to the effect that “[w]ithout international 
obligations to provide assistance—without global responsibility, that is—the right 
to health is not a right but a privilege reserved for those who are born outside of 
the world’s poorest countries.”206 Ooms and Hammonds further suggest that rich 
countries could satisfy this obligation of international cooperation and assistance 
by apportioning no more than 0.1% of their GDP to international health assistance, 
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to assist lower-income countries to realize the “core content” of the right to 
health.207 Obligations of assistance and cooperation are fundamental to support 
countries with limited resource capacities in achieving functional health capacities, 
as is the recognition of and support for global public goods in health, such as an 
eventual vaccine for COVID-19. 
However, the linkage that we have been constructing in these pages between 
health and democracy suggests examining more closely the underlying structural 
requirements that make the reapportionment of finances in sustainable and needs-
based ways dependent on the level of democratic solidarity between governmental 
units. For example, reapportioning finances is done within the United States, where 
the federal government routinely apportions tax revenue among states through 
grants, to entice certain states to fulfill federal objectives with regard to issues like 
education, social security, and health care.208 Indeed, the federal matching rate for 
Medicaid is higher in states with lower per capita income,209 indicating that richer 
states’ resources are being redistributed to some degree to pay for the Medicaid 
needs of poorer states.210 Currently, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Mississippi 
have some of the highest federal funding shares for Medicaid—with the federal 
government paying between 75% and 80% of the cost of the program in each of 
these states—and are all also among the ten states that consistently have the lowest 
GDP per capita in the country.211 Similarly, within the European Union (EU), 
wealthier countries subsidize public investment in poorer countries mainly through 
the EU’s Cohesion Policy, which accounts for nearly one-third of the EU’s budget, 
or €355.1 billion between 2014–2020.212 As part of that policy, the EU is targeting 
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€63.4 billion over that same time period to member states with per capita GNIs 
less than 90% of the EU average through the Cohesion Fund, in order to reduce 
economic and social disparities and promote development.213 Beneficiaries include 
Poland, Hungary, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Portugal.214 
These may be radically insufficient in practice. But what is crucial to 
recognize is that the above examples of transfers between locations do not occur 
merely due to coincidentally proximate geographic boundaries; they are unions 
tied together by some version of a social contract. States within the United States, 
or to a lesser extent members of the European Union, do not tend to frame their 
contributions as obligations of charitable assistance; these exchanges are mutually 
beneficial and are in fact constitutive of the political and economic communities 
to which the states belong. Indeed, the current “assistance” framing of the 
international legal obligation of rich countries to assist poor countries in realizing 
the right to health (and other ESC rights) constrains development of such a social 
contract in at least two ways. First, wealthy nations are able to sidestep their first 
and primary obligation to “do no harm,” and refrain from in any way undermining 
poorer nations’ efforts to realize the right to health. Second, the framing of these 
obligations in terms of foreign affairs and aid tends to remove the substantive 
issues from the domestic political realm in both donor and recipient states, making 
governments less accountable to their constituents.215 
More broadly, a focus on “assistance” and “aid” anneal the structural 
inequalities in the political economy of global health and beyond. The benefits that 
wealthier states extract from poor states, and the resulting resource and power 
asymmetries, are largely obfuscated by the focus on interstate assistance from 
donor states to aid-dependent states. Importantly, the same commission that 
defined “political determinants of health” also recognized that “[p]ower 
asymmetry and global social norms limit the range of choice and constrain action 
on health inequity” and that “major drivers of ill health lie beyond the control of 
national governments and, in many instances, also outside of the health sector.”216 
For example, transnational corporations contribute to social and political 
determinants of health, and result in health inequity, when they aggressively 
market health-damaging products—such as in the cigarette, sugar, and alcohol 
industries—onto local populations.217 Transnational corporations, such as those 
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within the soft drink industry, have also fostered the privatization—and sometimes 
the contamination—of local water supplies in developing countries, with the 
support of international financial institutions, including the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank.218 
Perhaps less intuitively, developing nations suffer even more profoundly at 
the hands of transnational corporations and international financial institutions 
through extraction of funds that would otherwise go to domestic infrastructure, 
including health. Despite the typical view of foreign aid as flowing from richer to 
poorer countries, current estimates indicate that “for every $1 of aid that 
developing countries receive, they lose $24 in net outflows.”219 These “outflows” 
occur through poorer states’ interest payments on sovereign debt, uneven trade 
agreements, illicit flows, and corporate tax evasion. For example, countries in the 
global South have paid over $4.2 trillion in interest payments on sovereign debts 
since 1980.220 “Illicit flows” comprise an even larger share of the money being 
drained out of developing nations, by transnational corporations seeking to avoid 
paying domestic taxes—often the same corporations hawking their corrosive 
products into the domestic markets. For example, corporations engage in a practice 
known as “trade misinvoicing” to evade taxes, which involves reporting “false 
prices on their trade invoices in order to spirit money out of developing countries 
directly into tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions” in sums that add up to hundreds 
of billions each year.221 Similar tactics for avoiding taxation, such as “same-
invoice faking” or “transfer pricing,” drain further hundreds of billions in tax 
dollars that could otherwise go toward the host states’ development of local 
infrastructure, including health.222 
The response to these facts then cannot be solely—or even primarily—calls 
for crumbs of charitable assistance that reify the colonialist global order. On the 
contrary, the actions of transnational corporations occur under the effective control 
of governments in the economic North, as do many of the policies instituted by 
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international financial institutions. The response, then, should be to reassert 
democratic control over decisions, which have fundamental implications for the 
fiscal space available for health institutions and beyond. As UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston called out the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, challenging longstanding 
pretensions that their policies and lending do not affect “political” questions.223 
The visibly ravaging effects of decisions regarding sovereign debt burdens and 
austerity during the COVID-19 pandemic,224 lend urgency to the imperative of 
radically democratizing these decisions in the future. 
The influential, although non-binding, Maastricht Principles on the 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights provide that a state has extraterritorial obligations with regard to situations 
“over which it exercises authority or effective control” in which its “acts or 
omissions bring about foreseeable effects” on the enjoyment of ESC rights, 
“whether within or outside its territory.”225 Since the issuance of the Maastricht 
Principles, UN treaty-monitoring bodies, domestic courts, and supranational 
tribunals have increasingly begun to examine countries’ extraterritorial obligations 
(ETOs) that stem from the actions of states or non-state actors and have harmful 
impacts elsewhere. These situations include those in which “the State, acting 
separately or jointly, whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, 
is in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize” ESC 
rights.226 
For example, in issuing an advisory opinion on State Obligations in Relation 
to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights 
to Life and to Personal Integrity,227 the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
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extended states’ obligations to respect the right to a healthy environment of those 
residing outside of a state’s territory. The Court clarified that the “concept of 
jurisdiction under Article 1(1) of the American Convention encompasses any 
situation in which a State exercises authority or effective control over an 
individual, either within or outside its territory.”228 Thus, states are responsible for 
extraterritorial impacts of activities occurring within their jurisdiction, and “must 
ensure that their territory is not used in such a way as to cause significant damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of their territory” 
if such damage would violate any person’s rights.229 
As tectonic a shift as ETOs might seem to imply, basic legal frameworks and 
models for addressing ETOs domestically have been generated in the past. For 
example, in the United States, the amended U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 prohibits U.S.-based persons (including corporations) from bribing officials 
of foreign jurisdictions to obtain business benefits.230 It is possible to imagine 
extending this sort of prohibition to persons and corporations whose U.S.-based 
activities contribute to the many kinds of extraterritorial flows out of foreign 
countries which can be tied directly to health. Moreover, in recent years there has 
been bipartisan support for incorporating requirements for improved—yet still 
tepid—labor and environmental standards for people in other countries under trade 
agreements such as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement,231 passed by 
the U.S. Congress in January 2020.232 In short, social pressures can be generated 
to hold governments that have effective control over the drivers of ill health 
accountable by their citizens through democratic institutions, rather than solely 
invoking the responsibility of countries where impacts are felt. 
While groundwork for ETOs has begun to be laid, we fully acknowledge that 
additional work and legal experimentalism is needed to refine the extent and 
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content of ETOs under different circumstances.233 However, the realities of our 
globalized world and the transnational drivers of health demand subjecting the 
policy and legal decisions that impact health abroad to greater democratic scrutiny 
and decision-making. Without doing so, assistance in the current political economy 
of global health compounds and obscures the legacies of colonialism and 
neocolonialism that generated the existing economic and political power 
imbalances in the first place, and displaces accountability to citizens with aid 
dependent upon donors. Imposing ETOs on states would necessitate that we first 
reconstitute and enlarge our understanding of the social contract as being inclusive 
of the transboundary effects of states and transnational corporations in this 
globalized world. 
CONCLUSION 
As underscored by differential governmental responses during the COVID-19 
pandemic, we have argued here that it is urgent to advance understanding of the 
linkage between democracy and health, which is too often considered a technical, 
“norm-free” subject. In doing so, we have emphasized that health, perhaps more 
than any other right, calls for a reconsideration of the traditionally isolated way in 
which human rights realization has generally been theorized. As South African 
Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs noted in his Soobramoney v. Minister of 
Health concurrence: 
Health care rights by their very nature have to be considered not only in a 
traditional legal context structured around the ideas of human autonomy but in a 
new analytical framework based on the notion of human interdependence . . . . 
When rights by their very nature are shared and inter-dependent, striking 
appropriate balances between the equally valid entitlements or expectations of a 
multitude of claimants should not be seen as imposing limits on those rights . . . 
but as defining the circumstances in which the rights may most fairly and 
effectively be enjoyed.234 
To date, health rights have too often been articulated in the abstract untethered 
from the institutional arrangements and democratic practices necessary to breathe 
life into them, as well as the political economy that invariably shapes such 
arrangements in practice. 
That scaffolding for health rights is inadequate because, as Rawls reminds us, 
“[t]he kind of lives that people can and do lead is importantly affected by the moral 
conception publicly realized in their society. What sorts of persons we are is 
shaped by how we think ourselves and this in turn is influenced by the social forms 
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we live under.”235 The set of rights the law recognizes as assets of citizenship and 
the ways health-related rights are defined play a fundamental role in 
understandings of governmental and private responsibility for patterns of suffering 
and well-being. COVID-19 struck a world shackled by decades of legal rules 
embedding privatization in health systems and inequalities in national and global 
political economies. Today, to move beyond the horrors and massive social trauma 
of the pandemic, we will need to rebuild our democracies in new ways, and 
rethinking the role of health and health systems, and the transboundary impacts on 
health that different structural factors have, should be an integral part of how we 
do so. 
As we have argued here, an understanding of health systems as democratic 
social institutions has implications, among other things, for (1) financing and 
delivery of goods, facilities, and services (including public health goods and 
services); (2) defining the contours of a legally enforceable health entitlement 
through legitimate processes; (3) oversight and regulation of the preceding 
conditions; and (4) provision of adequate information that allows decisions 
affecting health (made by governments and commercial actors alike) to be 
subjected to democratic scrutiny. As suggested by Justice Sachs in Soobramoney, 
here we have asserted that defining the contours of health rights—the process for 
determining what is included in guaranteed care and how it is delivered—belies 
the idea of rights as protections from the state and against one another: rights to be 
left alone. Rather, health rights require people to come together under conditions 
of background equality to analyze and make decisions about collective 
imperatives. 
Indeed, at a time when international human rights are increasingly widely 
perceived as disconnected from broader struggles for social justice and substantive 
democracy, we would do well to recall that all rights are ultimately “dependent for 
their normative force on the engagement and commitment of an active citizen 
body.”236 Nowhere is this recognition more crucial than in health, which 
determines so much of our ability to execute life plans and participate as diverse 
but equal members of our societies in one shared world. 
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